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I. INTRODUCTION 
Let us imagine a tenant living in a rented apartment. 
Unbeknownst to the tenant or the landlord, the circuit breaker in the 
apartment is faulty. While the tenant plays with her small child in the 
apartment one afternoon, the apartment catches fire. Although the 
tenant and her child are able to escape the burning apartment, both 
suffer severe physical injury and emotional distress. According to the 
residential landlord-tenant law of most American jurisdictions, our 
landlord has breached a contractual obligation imposed by the lease­
the implied warranty of habitability-by failing to maintain the 
apartment circuitry in a safe condition. And yet, because the harm 
suffered takes the form of physical injury and emotional distress, this 
breach appears to fit more squarely within the framework of tort law. 
The classification of the tenant's cause of action as either contractual 
or tort-based is essential: the rules governing the personal injury 
claims of the tenant and her child may be vastly different depending 
upon whether a court characterizes them as sounding in contract or in 
tort. Contractual liability likely exposes our landlord to strict liability, 
whereas liability in tort may be either strict or fault-based. Contractual 
recovery may not include damages for pain and suffering or emotional 
distress, whereas these damages would be awarded freely in tort. An 
exculpation clause may insulate the landlord from contractual, but not 
tort-based, liability. The statute of limitations may differ widely 
between the two causes of action. Moreover, a contractual theory of 
recovery would likely extend only to the tenant due to the rule of 
contractual privity, whereas a tort theory would extend equally to the 
tenant and the tenant's child. 
In cases such as this one, only a small minority of American 
jurisdictions have employed a contract theory to hold a landlord liable 
for personal injuries. The overwhelming majority of American courts 
have found contract inapplicable to tenants' personal injury lawsuits 
and instead apply a tort-based negligence analysis. The American 
majority approach to landlord liability is the result of decades of 
debate that followed the "revolution" of residential landlord-tenant 
law-the reconceptualization of the residential lease as a contract and 
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the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability.1 Although a 
contract model was initially chosen to implement this newfound 
tenant-protection device, contract law strains to contain this state­
imposed obligation relating not to economic expectations, but to 
physical safety and emotional security. American jurisdictions have 
dealt with the problem of contract law's awkward fit with legally 
imposed duties by adopting a bifurcated approach to landlord liability. 
Economic harm is compensated in contract; physical injury is 
compensated in tort. 2 As a result, depending on the type of harm 
suffered, a tenant may have two very different claims against the 
landlord based on the same wrongful act. Now that the dust has settled 
following the landlord-tenant revolution, the time is ripe for assessing 
whether this bifurcated approach is optimal, or whether an alternative 
model would better address the needs of residential tenants, who 
comprise nearly thirty percent of the American population. 3 
The relatively recent transformation of landlord-tenant law has 
imported into the common law landlord-tenant relationship a number 
of obligations that have been recognized in civil law leases for 
centuries.4 Thus the common law's embrace of an implied warranty of 
habitability closed a long-existing gulf between the two legal 
traditions' approaches to the obligations of residential landlords. In 
both traditions today, breach of the landlord's obligation to provide a 
safe and habitable d welling gives rise to traditional contractual 
remedies, including termination of the lease and damages.5 However, 
the treatment of personal injuries, property damage, and nonpecuniary 
losses continues to differ across jurisdictional lines. While American 
tenants who suffer such losses are largely restricted to a tort theory of 
recovery, civil law tenants have both contractual and tort theories at 
their disposal.6 This Article turns to the civilian tradition to determine 
I 
. See Samuel Bassett Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant 
Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1976); Mary Ann Glendon, The 
Tra.ns!Onnation of American Landford-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (1982); 
Edward H. Rabin, 7be Revolution in Residential Landford-Tenant Law: Causes and 
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 521 (1984). 
2. See infra Part IL 
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 
2007 (2008), http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/h l 50-07.pdf 
4. See infia Part III. 
5. See infia Parts II & III. 
6. See infra Parts II & III. 
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whether this concurrent approach to landlord liability better allocates 
the risk of harm between residential landlords and their tenants.7 
The increasing convergence among the oft-polarized common 
law and civil law traditions has been of late a subject of great interest.8 
Comparative scholarship not only provides fodder for legal reform, but 
also furthers understanding of differences, whether they result from 
history, social policy, or sheer chance.9 And yet, comparative 
examination of residential landlord-tenant law is relatively scarce. 10 
7. This Article focuses exclusively on residential, rather than commercial, leases. 
Although American residential landlord-tenant law has undergone a dramatic transformation 
through the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability, in most jurisdictions commercial 
landlords are still heavily insulated from responsibility for the condition of the premises. 5 
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 44.07(a) (David A Thomas & N. Gregory Smith eds., 2d 
ed. 2007). 
Additionally, this Article deliberately utilizes the terms "landlord" and "tenant" rather 
than "lessor" and "lessee" to refer to the parties to a residential lease. Although the latter 
designations are perhaps more commonly employed in civil law parlance than the former, the 
former are universally employed in the context of residential tenancy. Thus their use is 
intended to stress the emphasis on the residential lessor/lessee relationship. 
8. See generally THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN 
INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF T HE 21 ST CENTURY (B.S. Markesinis ed., 
1994); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 
52, 54 (1996); Ugo Mattei, Three Pattems of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's 
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 8 (1997); Luke Nottage, Comment on Civil Law and 
Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal, 32 VICTORIA U. WELLING1DN 
L. REv. 843 (200 I); Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the 
Second Half of the Twentieth Centwy, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002); C.H. van Rhee, 
Towards a Procedural !us Commune?, in REMEDIES IN ZUID-AFRIK.A EN EUROPA 217-32 (J. 
Smits & G. Lubbe eds., 2003); Reinhard Zinunermann, 'Double Cross': Comparing Scots 
and South African Law, in MlxED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY 
AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCO TLAND AND SOUT H AFRICA 1-2 (Reinhard Zimmermann et al. eds., 
2004). 
9. See MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 8, at v. 
Above all, comparative law seeks to 
resolve the accidental and divisive differences in the laws of peoples at similar 
stages of cultural and economic development, and reduce the number of 
divergencies in law, attributable not to the political, moral, or social qualities of the 
different nations but to historical accident or to temporary or contingent 
circumstances. 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (Tony Weir trans., 
3d ed. 1998). 
10. A few comparative works were undertaken during the initial phases of the United 
States landlord-tenant "revolution." See, e.g., E.J. Cohn, Some Comparative Aspects of the 
Law of Landlord and Tenant, 11 Moo. L. REv. 377 (1948); Michael Lipsky & Carl A. 
Newnann, Landlord-Tenant Law in the United States and U'est Gennany-A Comparison of 
Legal Approaches, 44 TuL. L. REv. 36, 66 (1969). Additionally, the European University 
Institute recently completed a comprehensive comparative study of European tenancy laws 
that is the first of its kind. See Tenancy Law and Procedure jn the EU, EUROPEAN UNIY. INST., 
http://www.eui.ewDepartmentsAndCentres/Law/ResearchAndTeaching/ResearchThemes/ 
ProjectTenancyLaw.aspx (last updated Sept. 25, 2009); see also RICHARD FORD, A 
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The paucity of comparative research in this area likely stems from the 
fact that regulation of residential leases is inextricably intertwined with 
housing policy, a matter generally thought of as local in character.11 
Moreover, the fact that landlord-tenant relations, like many consumer 
protection regimes, are governed by an amalgam of contract, property, 
administrative, tort, and occasionally, constitutional law, makes them 
particularly difficult to study even in the domestic context, much less 
comparatively. Nonetheless, comparative study of tenancy law is 
critical. Such analysis allows for the pooling of knowledge, 12 and it 
permits the study of more recent common law reforms against a 
backdrop of legal systems that have applied similar concepts for many 
years.13 To that end, this Article endeavors both to fill a gap in the 
comparative literature and to provide a critical appraisal, through a 
comparative lens, of the American approach to habitability in 
residential lease. 
A close examination of the apparently disparate regimes 
governing the obligations of residential landlords reveals that the 
action against the landlord who has breached the obligation to 
maintain the premises, whether classified as contract- or tort-based, is 
treated similarly in many respects across jurisdictional lines. Where 
differences between the approaches exist, they stem primarily from the 
rules governing the distinction between contract and tort. Moreover, 
regardless of the theory of recovery employed, each system suffers 
from unique anomalies and injustices. These difficulties are a direct 
product of the system of classification and the interplay between 
contract and tort. Comparative observation leads to the conclusion that 
the landlord's liability for defective premises has been shaped more by 
the arbitrary dividing line between contract and tort than by reasoned 
policy making. Thus this Article argues that landlord liability for 
defective premises is best characterized as "contort;' a hybrid 
obligation whose contours reflect elements of both contract and tort.14 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW OF LEASE CONTRACTS IN ENGLAND AND THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC ( 1995); Chari Hugo & Philip Simpson, Lease, in MlxED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 301 (1994); Marketa Selucka, Carissa Meyer & Johan Schweigl, 
Tem1ination of a Lease Contract: General 'Wew from Czech and fllinois law, 12 TOURO 
[NT'L L. REV. 64 (2009). 
1 1  . See CHRISTOPH u. SCHMID, GENERAL REPORT I ' http://www.eui.eu/Docurnents/ 
DepartrnentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching!ResearchT hemes/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Tenancy 
Law Project/TenancyLawGeneralReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 20 I 0). 
1 2 . See Cohn, supnrnote 10, at 400. 
13. See Lipsky & Neumann, supra note I 0, at 37. 
14. The tenn "contort" was coined by Grant Gilmore in his The Death of Contract 
lectures, in which he concluded "'contract' is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort,'" 
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In so doing, this author seeks to anchor the landlord's obligation to 
maintain the premises among other contorts, including, for example, 
legal malpractice, medical malpractice, and products liability.15 These 
and other examples illustrate that recasting an obligation as contort 
emancipates it from the confines of classification and permits 
lawmakers to choose the attributes that best suit social policy, 
regardless of taxonomy. Landlord liability for defective premises 
could benefit from similar liberation. 
Part II of this Article traces the development of the American 
approach to landlord liability for the condition of the premises, from 
its historical roots through its twentieth-century revolution to its 
modem application. In so doing, Part II highlights the reasons for the 
American approach and its resulting anomalies. Part III examines the 
approaches of several "mixed" jurisdictions whose landlord-tenant law 
is grounded in the civilian tradition.16 This analysis demonstrates that 
each of these jurisdictions has struggled with the nature of a landlord's 
obligation for the condition of the premises, and explores the 
difficulties each jurisdiction has encountered at the border between 
contract and tort. Part IV revisits the timeless struggle to define 
contract and tort as two distinct types of obligations, and reviews the 
recognition of "contorts"--obligations that defy classification by their 
very nature. Part IV concludes that landlord liability for defective 
premises is best characterized as contort and argues that such recasting 
is necessary to eliminate the conceptual difficulties and practical 
injustices that to date have infected the regimes of not only some 
civilian jurisdictions, but those of the United States. 
and suggested that, as a result of this phenomenon, the first-year courses in Contracts and 
Torts could be replaced with a single course entitled "Contorts." GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-98 (1974). Scholars have since used the term to describe obligations 
consisting of a blend of elements deriving from both contract and tort. See, e.g, Saul 
Litvinoff, Contract, Delict, Morals, and Law, 45 LOY. L. REv. 1 ,  43 (1 999). 
15. See inm Part Iv.A 
1 6. Although the term "mixed jurisdiction" has a number of connotations, this Article 
uses it in its narrow, technical sense to describe legal systems "at the intersection between 
common law and civil law." Zimmermann, supra note 8, at 3. For a full discussion of the 
reasons that mixed jurisdictions generally, and Scotland, South Africa, and Louisiana, 
specifically, are explored in this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 133- 1 38. 
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II. THE COMMON LAW REGIME 
A. Histoncal Approach: Caveat Lessee and Tort Immunity 
4 1 9  
Historically, the common law regarded the residential lease as a 
blend of contract and conveyance of real property.11 One result of 
characterizing the lease as a conveyance was the adaptation of the 
common law doctrine of caveat emptor to the lease context as caveat 
Jessee.18 Like a purchaser of real property, a tenant was expected to 
inspect the premises prior to the inception of the lease, and in the 
absence of any express covenant to the contrary, the landlord owed no 
obligation relating to the condition of the premises or their fitness for 
use.19 The standard common law residential lease consisted merely of 
two principal obligations: the landlord's obligation to maintain the 
tenant in peaceful possession of the premises (the covenant of "quiet 
enjoyment") and the tenant's obligation to pay rent.2° 
Of course, a tenant could negotiate for the landlord to assume a 
covenant of repair, but such express contractual protections were rarely 
available to residential tenants, who generally had little bargaining 
power.21 Even where the landlord did covenant for the maintenance 
and repair of the premises, breach of that obligation did not entitle the 
tenant to dissolve the lease or withhold rent.22 Rather, an aggrieved 
tenant's only right was an action for damages.23 Because a lease was 
regarded as a type of convey ance, the covenants of the landlord and 
tenant were construed as independent of one another.24 
The property law paradigm had ramifications in the tort context 
as well.25 The common law of occupier's liability generally imposed 
17. See Glendon, supra note l, at 505-09. Glendon notes that the contractual and 
proprietary aspects of the residential lease were stressed to different degrees at different times 
in history. Id at 505-06. Thus the nature of the lease varied substantially between the 
thirteenth century (when the lease was used primarily as a security device) and the fifteenth 
century (by which time the lease was used more commonly for farming). Id 
18. See Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, 
Negligence, or StdctLiability?, 1975 Wrs. L. REv. 19, 27-28 (1975). 
19. Id 
20. Id at 32. 
2 1. Id 
22. Id at 31. 
23. Id 
24. Id at 32 . ln practice, the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment and the tenant's 
obligation to pay rent were construed as mutually dependent by courts despite their technical 
independence. Id at 33. However, the same treatment was never applied to any other express 
or implied covenants of the landlord. Id 
25. Id at 48-49; Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of 
Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99, 101 (1982). 
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duties on landowners t o  protect persons lawfully on the premises from 
unreasonable risks of hann.26 The rationale for the imposition of 
liability was that between the landowner and the person entering the 
land, only the former had any meaningful ability to prevent such 
harm.21 This rationale only holds, however, when the landowner is in 
possession or control of the premises.28 In the context of lease, the 
tenant acquires both possession and control of the premises, and the 
landlord enjoys a mere reversionary interest.29 That transfer of 
possession and control not only absolved the landlord from tort 
responsibility to the tenant, it shifted the responsibility owed to third 
persons from the landlord to the tenant as well. 30 
Thus common law landlords enjoyed complete immunity from 
liability, whether in contract or in tort. According to the doctrine of 
caveat lessee, under which the tenant assumed all risks associated with 
defects in the premises, the landlord could not be held contractually 
responsible for the premises' condition.11 Furthermore, the landlord 
was not liable in tort to anyone, including the tenant or family and 
guests, due to the lack of possession. 12 This was true even in the rare 
case in which the landlord assumed a contractual obligation to 
maintain the premises in good condition.13 As articulated by the King's 
Bench in 1905, "A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state, is 
not liable to the tenant's customers or guests for accidents happening 
during the term; for, fraud apart, there is no law against letting a 
tumble-down house."34 
26. Browder, supra. note 25, at 102-03. In fact, the common law imposed varying 
degrees of care on occupiers of premises based upon whether the person entering the 
premises, who was then injured, was properly classified as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. 
Robert S. Driscoll, The Law of Prenlises Liability in Amenca: Its Past, Present, and Some 
Considerations for Its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 881, 883-84 (2006). This tripartite 
classification system was abolished in England in 1 957 by the Occupiers' Liability Act, under 
which a landowner owes a general duty of care to anyone lawfully on the premises. See id at 
885; Occupiers' Liability Act, 1 957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 , § 2(1). In the United States, the 
tripartite classification system has been abolished in many, but not all, jurisdictions. See 
Driscoll, supra, at 888-91 . 
27. See w PAGE KEEroN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEEroN ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57 
(5th ed. 1 984). 
28. See 1d §§ 57, 63. 
29. 5 THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 41 .09(a). 
30. Love, supra. note 18, at 48-49. 
31.  Id 
32. Id 
33. Cavalier v. Pope, [1905) 2 K.B. 757 (Eng.). 
34. Id 
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B Modem Vanation: The Umted States 
I. From Caveat Lessee to Landlord Liability 
421 
The doctrine of caveat Jessee was received in the United States as 
a part of the common law of England.35 At the tum of the twentieth 
century, landlord-tenant law was so firmly entrenched in agrarian, 
feudalistic principles that Justice Holmes was prompted to remark that 
"the law as to leases is not a matter of logic in vacua:, it is a matter of 
history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."36 In the near century since 
this remark was made, United States landlord-tenant law has under­
gone a "revolution" which has, in large part, detached the residential 
lease from its historical moorings.37 
Initially, allocation of responsibility for the condition of the 
premises to tenants seemed both fair and sensible. The "no-duty" rule 
was thought to reflect the implied intentions of the parties.38 Many 
leases were agrarian in nature, and the agricultural leaseholder was 
generally capable, in terms of both skill and financial means, to inspect 
the premises at the outset of the lease and to make repairs as they 
became necessary. 39 However, as urban leases of dwellings became 
more prevalent, courts in the United States began to view the rule of 
caveat lessee as inappropriate when applied to residential leases.40 The 
leased premises, which once consisted primarily of land and 
occasionally of simple improvements, were now complex, multiunit  
35. John S. Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VAL. U. L .  REv. 189, 198-99 (1968). There were 
some exceptions. For example, even before the landlord-tenant "revolution," the law of 
Georgia provided that the landlord in a lease with a term less than five years owed an implied 
obligation of repair and maintenance of the premises in a condition reasonably fit for 
habitation. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-l to -13 (2010) (original versions at GA. CODE OF 
1863 §§ 2261, 2266); Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory WammtJcs of 
Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 54-56 
( 1979). Similarly, the 1848 Field Code, which imposed an obligation of repair on landlords, 
substantially influenced the adoption of limited obligations of repair on landlords in 
California, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Id at 56-59. 
36. Gardiner v. William S .  Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918) (in dictum). 
37. The transformation of U.S. landlord-tenant law and the broader implications of 
this transformation has been fully treated elsewhere. For an excellent discussion of the 
transition, see generally Glendon, supra note I. The implied warranty of habitability, upon 
which this paper focuses, comprised only a part of this revolution. Other revolutionary 
changes, all pro-tenant, included impositions of rent control and the development of 
prohibitions on retaliatory eviction. See id 
38. James Charles Smith, Tenant Remedies for Breach of Habitability: Tort 
Dimensions ofa Contract Concept, 35 U. KAN. L. REv. 505, 509 (1987). 
39. Love, sup.m note 18, at 28. 
40. Id at 29-31; see, e.g., Young v. Povich, 116 A. 26, 27 (Me. 1922); Ingalls v. 
Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286, 286-87 (Mass. 1892); Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 136 N.Y.S. 140, 142 (App . 
Term 1912). 
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structures.41 The tenants of these dwellings were generally poor, 
unskilled laborers who had neither the funds nor the skills to make 
inspections or repairs.42 
Inroads into the doctrine of caveat Jessee were made slowly at 
first. For example, first English courts, and then American courts, 
recognized a limited implied warranty of habitability in short-term 
leases of furnished apartments.43 Later, American courts held that an 
implied covenant of fitness existed in all leases of premises to be used 
for a specific purpose, so long as the premises were under construction 
at the time the lease was negotiated.44 Soon after, an exception to 
caveat lessee was imposed when the landlord failed to disclose a 
dangerous defect in the premises of which the landlord knew and 
which was not discoverable by the tenant. 45 However, these exceptions 
were narrow in their application and were not widely adopted.46 The 
few judicial exceptions to caveat Jessee were ultimately viewed as 
inadequate to protect urban residential tenants. Later, statutory housing 
codes were enacted in an effort to establish and maintain minimum 
standards for residential dwellings, but governmental enforcement was 
ineffective at producing results, and statutes providing for private 
causes of action were narrowly drawn.47 
Meaningful change did not appear until the judicial imposition of 
the implied warranty of habitability in all residential leases. Although 
first recognized in the early 1930s, the implied warranty did not 
become widespread until the 1970s.48 The seminal case adopting the 
warranty is Javins v. First National Realty Corp., decided in 1970 by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. 49 The court repudiated the doctrine of caveat Jessee as 
41. Love, supra. note 18, at 28. 
42. Id 
43. Id at 29-30. 
44. Id at 30-31. 
45. Id at 31. 
46.  5 THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 4l .04(a)(2Xi). For example, these exceptions only 
covered defects that existed at the time of the inception of the lease, and not defects that arose 
thereafter. T he utility of these exceptions was further hampered by the doctrine of 
independent covenants. See Love, supra. note 18, at 31-33. 
47. See5 THOMPSON, supra.note 7, § 41.05(a)-(b). 
48. T he first case to recognize an implied warranty of habitability in residential 
leases was Delamaterv. Foreman, 239 N.W 148, 149 (Minn. 1931). 
49. 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (D.C. Cir.), cert demed, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). It is worth 
noting that that Judge J. Skelly W right, the author of the opinion, was a graduate of the 
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, where he studied the Louisiana civil law. 
Vernon V P almer, The Residential Lease in the Civil Law-A Considera.tion in Social 
Context, 4 TUl.. Crv. L.F. 3, 6 (1988). In justifying the characterization of the lease as a 
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outmoded in light of modem urban housing conditions, recognized an 
implied warranty of habitability in all residential leases, and held that 
this warranty and the tenant's duty to pay rent are correlative.so 
As of this writing, all American jurisdictions except Arkansas 
recognize an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.s1 
Some jurisdictions recognize the warranty jurisprudentially, while 
others have enacted the warranty statutorily.52 Additionally, many 
bilateral contract, Judge Wright cited to the Louisiana Civil Code and Marcel Planiol's 
Treatise on the Civil Law, remarking: "The civil law has always viewed the lease as a 
contract, and in our judgment that perspective has proved superior to that of the common 
law." Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075 n.13. 
50. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1078-89. 
51. See Ashley E. Norman, A Tenant's DJ1emma: The Arkansas Residential 
Landlord-TenantActof2007, 62 ARK. L. REv. 859, 859 (2009). 
52. Jurisdictions in which the highest courts have adopted the implied warranty of 
habitability include California, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana (implied in 
fact only), Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. Green v. Superior a., 
517 P.2d 1168, 1169-70 (Cal. 1974); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077; Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 
470, 472-75 (Haw. 1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (Ill. 1972); Johnson 
v. Scandia Assocs., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. 1999); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 
(Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304, 309-10 (Kan. 1974); Boston Rous. Auth. v. 
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 270 
(Mo. 1984); O'Cain v .  Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc. of Miss., 603 So. 2d 824, 833 (Miss. 
1991); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (N.H. 1971); Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 
534 (N.J. 1970); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. 1979); Kamara.th v. Bennett, 568 
S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. 1978), superseded by statute, T EX. REV. CIY. STAT. ANN. art. 5236f 
(West 1982) (current version at T EX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052 (West 2010)), as recognized 
in Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien, 796 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App. 1990); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 
1006, 1010 (Utah 1991); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208 (Vt. 1984); Foisy v. Wyman, 
515 P2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 123 (W. Va. 1978). 
Jurisdictions with statutory warranties include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ALA. CODE § 35-9A-204 
(2010); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (2010);AR!z. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 33-1324 (2010); CAL. Crv. 
CODE § 1941 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47a-7 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5305 (2010); FLA. STAT.ANN. § 83.51 (West 
2010); GA. CODE ANN.§ 44-7-13 (2010); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 521-42 (LexisNexis 2010); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-320 (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-31-8-5 (West 2010); IOWA CODE 
ANN.§ 562A.15 (West 2010); KAN. STAT.ANN. § 58-2553 (West 2010); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 383.595 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2691 (2010); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14, § 6021 (2010); Mo. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 111, §§ 127-127P, ch. 239, §§ 1-9 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAW S ANN. 
§ 554.139 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.161(West 2010); Miss. CODE ANN. §  89-8-
23 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-303 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1419 
(LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REv. S TAT. ANN. § 118A.280 (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 47-8-20 (West 2010); N.Y REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 42-42 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (2010); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 
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states have adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 
which contains both a general obligation of habitability as well as a 
detailed list of additional maintenance responsibilities allocated to the 
landlord. 53 Generally, a defect is considered actionable if it renders the 
premises unsafe or unsanitary. 54 Thus the obligation of maintenance is 
tied directly to the health and safety of the tenant. In all jurisdictions, 
(LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 90.320 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-18-22 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-
40-440 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-32-8 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 66-28-304 (2010); 
Tux. PROP. CODE ANN.§ 92.052 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4457 (2010); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-248.13 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (LexisNexis 2010); W VA. 
CODE ANN. § 37-6-30 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West 2010); WYO. STAT. 
ANN.§ 1-21-1202 (2010). 
53. For a table of jurisdictions that have adopted the URLTA, see 7B UNIFORM LAWS 
ANNOTATED 285 (2010). The following states have adopted the URLTA: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. ALA. CODE §§ 35-9A-101 to -603; A LASKA STAT. 
§§ 34.03.010-.380; Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN . §§ 33-1301 to -1381; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 47a-l to -20a; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.67; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 521-1 to -78; IOWA 
CODE ANN. §§ 562A.l -.37; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to -2573; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 383.500-.715; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 554.601-.616; MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 89-8-1 to -
27; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-24-101 to -442; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1401 to -1449; 
N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 47-8-1 to -52; OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 41, §§ 101-136; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 90.100-.940; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-1 to -57; S.C. CoDE ANN . §§ 27-40-10 to -940; 
TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 66-28-101 to -521; VA . CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to .40; WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN. §§ 59.18.010-430, .900. Section 2.104(a) of the Uniform Residential Landlord 
Tenant Act provides: 
A landlord shall 
(1) comply with the requirements of applicable building and housing codes 
materially affecting health and safety; 
(2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises 
in a fit and habitable condition; 
(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition; 
(4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, 
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air-conditioning, and other facilities 
and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by 
him; 
( 5) provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the 
removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the 
occupancy of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and 
(6) supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times and 
reasonable heat [between [October I] and [May I]] except where the 
building that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped 
for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water 
is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and 
supplied by a direct public utility connection. 
54. See, e.g., Detling, 671 S.W2d at 270; see also Myron Moskowitz, The Implied 
War:ranryr of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 C ALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1459 
(1974). 
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waiver of the warranty of habitability is either entirely foreclosed or 
very limited, in recognition of both the importance of the social policy 
underpinning the warranty and the residential tenant's relative lack of 
bargaining power. 55 
2. The Tort Aspects of the Warranty of Habitability 
As they were adopted, both statutory and judicial warranties 
recognized a variety of contractual remedies, including dissolution of 
the lease, reformation of the lease, repair-and-deduct rights, rent 
withholding, and awards for compensatory damages.56 However, it 
was not immediately apparent whether consequential losses for 
personal injury and property damage arising from breach of the 
warranty of habitability would be available to tenants, and, if so, 
whether such recovery would be predicated on breach of contract or 
tort. 
By the time the warranty of habitability arrived in the main­
stream, the rule of complete landlord immunity from responsibility in 
tort had begun to falter slightly.57 But once the implied warranty of 
habitability was recognized in all residential leases, courts gradually 
began to favor a broad tort model of recovery for tenants and third 
parties. As early as 1973, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
announced that by adopting the implied warranty of habitability 
several years earlier, it had "discarded the very legal foundation and 
justification for the landlord's immunity in tort for injuries to the tenant 
or third persons" and abandoned the rule oflandlord immunity in favor 
55 .  5 THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 41 .06(a)(5). For example, the Restatement (Second) 
of Property § 5.6 states that the parties "may agree to increase or decrease what would 
otherwise be the obligations of the landlord with respect to the condition of the leased 
property" as long as the agreement is not "unconscionable or significantly against public 
policy." Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 5 .6  
( 1977)). 
56. Id § 43.05(a). 
57. Several exceptions to the rule emerged from the jurisprudence. For example, 
landlords were held liable for preexisting defects known to the landlord, but not the tenant. 
Love, supra note 18, at 50-5 1 .  Also, injuries caused by defects in premises leased for 
admission to the public were compensable in tort. Id at 53-54. Injuries caused by defects in 
common areas, over which the landlord was said to retain control, were also found to be 
compensable. See 1d Landlords were held responsible for injuries resulting from the failure 
to effect expressly covenant repairs as well as for injuries caused by the negligent making of 
repairs. See id at 57-65 . Tort liability was also occasionally premised on violations of 
housing codes setting forth statutory repair obligations. See id at 68-78. Finally, a minority 
of jurisdictions held that a landlord in breach of the implied warranty of habitability in 
furnished dwellings was also liable in tort. Id. at 54-57. The standard of liability imposed 
under these theories ranged from negligence to strict liability. See generally id at 48-78. 
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of a general negligence theory.58 Another approach to tort liability was 
adopted in 1 977 by the Restatement of Property, which provides that 
landlords may be liable for personal injury and property damage 
caused by the landlord's failure to exercise reasonable care to repair a 
defect in violation of the implied warranty of habitability or o ther 
statutory or administrative duty.59 
A few isolated decisions went so far as to hold residential 
landlords strictly liable in tort for defects in the premises.60 For 
example, in 1985, the California Supreme Court held in Becker v. !RM 
Corp. that a landlord was strictly liable for injuries suffered by a tenant 
who slipped and fell against an untempered glass shower door. 61 T he 
court justified its imposition of strict liability on the ground that 
modern urban tenants are neither in the position to inspect residential 
premises for latent defects nor to bear the costs of repairs.62 T he court 
also drew an analogy to the context of the sale of goods, where well­
settled products liability principles hold manufacturers strictly liable in 
tort for personal injuries arising from latent defects.63 The court 
remarked, ''The landlord who markets the product bears the costs of 
injuries resulting from the defects."64 
58. Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973). 
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 17.6 ( 1977). 
The Restatement provides: 
A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others 
upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a 
dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken possession, 
if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the existence 
of the condition is in violation of: 
( I)  an implied warranty of habitability; or 
(2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation. 
Id The term "physical harm" contained in section 1 7.6 has been interpreted to include harm 
to land and chattels as well as harm to the person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7.3 
(1965); Miller v. Christian, 958 F.2d 1 234, 1240 (3d Cir. 1992). States adopting the 
Restatement approach include Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington. 
Thompson v. Crownover, 381 S.E.2d 283, 285 (Ga. 1989); Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. 
Brunson, 645 A.2d 1 147, 1 1 52 (Md. 1994), oveJTu!ed on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin 
Realty ill, Inc., 835 A.2d 616, 622 (Md. 2003); Scott v. Garfield, 9 1 2  N.E.2d 1 000, 1 006 
(Mass. 2009); Morris v. Kaylor Eng'g Co., 565 S.W2d 334, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 978); Lian 
v. Stalick, 25 P3d 467, 474 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
60. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Coulston, 381 N.YS.2d 634, 638 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1 976); see 
also Shroades v. Rental Homes, Inc., 427 N.E.2d 774, 777-78 (Ohio 1981)  (holding violation 
of statutory warranty of habitability constitutes negligence per se). 
6 1 .  698 P.2d 1 16, 1 1 7 (Cal. 1985). 
62. Id at 122-23. 
63. Id at 1 1 8. 
64. Id at 123. 
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The Becker decision generated a great deal of controversy and 
academic debate regarding the suitability of the analogy between 
residential leases and sales of goods, and more broadly, the propriety 
of subjecting landlords to strict liability.65 Ten years after Becker, the 
California Supreme Court reevaluated its ruling and ultimately 
overruled it, holding that "we erred in Becker in applying the doctrine 
of strict products liability to a residential landlord that is not a part of 
the manufacturing or marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective 
product that caused the injury."66 The few decisions in other 
jurisdictions finding landlords strictly liable were not followed; rather, 
several courts specifically considered and rejected the application of 
strict liability to residential landlords.67 
A number of jurisdictions have wrestled with the issue of whether 
to permit tenants to recover on a breach of contract theory. A minority 
of courts have held that a tenant may recover damages for personal 
injuries or property damage on the contract.68 These tribunals 
considered consequential damages for personal injury and property 
damage to be fairly within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
of contracting.69 However, these decisions have largely either been 
overruled or not followed. 
65. See, e.g., Emily M. H aliday, Comment, Ca/iforma 's Approach to Landlord 
L1ab1Jity for Tenant lnjunes: Strict Liability Reexamined, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 367 ( 1993); 
Joan L. Neisser, The Tenant as Consumer: Applying Strict Liability Principles to Landlords, 
64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 527 (1990); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Stnd Tort LiabiJity of 
Landlords: Bec ker v. IRM Corp. in Contex� 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125 (1986). 
66. Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P2d 905, 906 (Cal. 1995). 
67. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 301 A.2d 463, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div.), aff'dper curiam, 3 1 1 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1973); Segal v. Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., 
Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465-66 (Civ. Ct. 1980), affif per curiam, 442 N.YS.2d 686 (App. 
Tenn. 1 981 ); Pezzolanella v. Galloway, 503 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992 (Utica Cit y  Ct. 1986). 
68. See, e.g., Lovick v. Nigro, No. LPLCV9405424735, 1997 WL 1 12806, at *5-6 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 1 997); Boudreau v. Gen. E lec. C o., 625 P2d 384, 390 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 198 1) ;  Simon v. Solomon, 43 1 N.E.2d 556, 570 (Mass. 1982); Trentacost v. Brussel, 
4 12  A.2d 436, 443 (N.J. 1980); see also Estate of Vazquez v. Hepner, 564 N.W2 d 426, 430 
(Iowa 1997) (holding, in a case involving the death of tenant, that an aggrieved tenant may 
recover incidental and consequential damages, but finding no vio lation of the warranty); 
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W2d 791 ,  797 (Iowa 1972) ("In all events, tenant should have the 
incidental and consequential damages which fall within the general principles governing the 
allowance of such damages."). 
69. See Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2 d  744, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1 976) 
("[T]here appears to be a growing recogni tion that a residential landlord may be held liable 
for breach of the implied warran t y  of habitabi lit y contained in the lease (a contract) resulting 
in personal injury or personal property damage to the tenant. The consequential damages 
envisioned by Hadley v. Baxendale logically come to fruition in breach of an implied 
warrant y  of habitabili t y."), superseded as moo� 369 N.E.2d 404 (Ind. 1977); see also 
Boudreau, 625 P.2d at 390 (arguing that "the implied warrant y of habitability does not extend 
to personal injuries seems to us to be logically meritless"). 
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The majority of courts to consider the issue have determined that 
a claim on the contract is not the proper vehicle for recovery of 
personal injury or property damages. A 1 991 decision of the Vermont 
Supreme Court, Favreau v. Miller, squarely addressed this issue. 10 The 
court stated that where personal injury is concerned, tort principles 
provide a "more straightforward way" to delineate the rights and duties 
of the parties.11 The court was particularly concerned with issues of 
causation, fault, and comparative negligence, all of which, it opined, a 
tort model is better equipped to handle.72 Still other courts have based 
their refusal to award personal injury and property damages on a 
contract theory on the notion that the landlord should not be cast in 
strict liability as an "insurer" of the tenant. 73 The preference for 
adjudication of the landlord's fault is thus one compelling basis for 
refusing to award personal injury or property damages on a contract 
theory.74 
Beyond fault, additional grounds have been articulated for refusal 
to award personal injury damages for breach of the warranty of 
habitability. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled in 2003 
that to permit the recovery of personal injury damages on an implied 
warranty of habitability theory "would eliminate the fundamental 
distinctions between contract and tort and only lead to further 
confusion regarding the nature and role of these two theories of 
recovery."75 Other jurisdictions have refused to award damages for 
personal injury or property damage on the ground that such 
consequential damages are not within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time of contracting. 76 Another contingent of courts have applied 
70. 591 A.2d 68 (Vt. 1 99 1). 
7 1 .  Id at 73; see also Schuman v. Kobets, 760 N.E.2d 682, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 
("We agree that these are questions better left to be resolved by the rules developed under tort 
and negligence law."). 
72. Favreau, 591 A.2d at 73. 
73. See, e.g. , Proffer v. Randall, 755 S.W2d 655, 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 988); Loven v. 
Davis, 783 S.W2d 152, 155-56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
74. See, e.g., Antwaun v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 596 N.W2d 456, 469 (Wis. 1 999) 
("An injured parties' [sic] claim for personal injuries is a tort claim in negligence . . . . It is 
not the breach of warranty . . .  that gives rise to the cause of action for the personal injury. 
Instead, it is the negligent act or omission."). 
75. See Howard ex rel Mcintyre v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 8 1 6  A.2d 1204, 1 2 1 2  (Pa. 
Comrnw. Ct. 2003); see also Beese v. Nat'! Bank of Albany Park, 403 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980) (refusing damages for personal injury due to the "economic and social 
consequences" involved). 
76. See, e.g, Johnson v. Scandia Assocs., Inc., 7 1 7  N.E.2d 24 (Ind. 1999). Indiana 
has not recognized a warranty of habitability implied by law in every residential lease; rather, 
an implied warranty of habitability exists only when implied in fact in a particular agreement. 
See id at 32. On the issue of personal injury damages, the court held: ''Where the warranty 
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a more extreme approach, refusing to award consequential damages of 
kind 77 any . 
Massachusetts courts have most thoroughly vetted the problem of 
contractual recovery for personal injury and property damages. In its 
1 979 decision in Crowell v. McCaf!Tey, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court recognized the availability of recovery for personal injury 
damages resulting from breach of the warranty of habitability.78 In the 
ensuing years, a number of tenants relied on Crowell to assert claims 
against their landlords for personal injury or property damage 
sounding not in tort, but in breach of contract. 79 Even still, following 
Crowell, the scope and nature of claims for personal injuries resulting 
from landlords' breach of the implied warranty of habitability 
remained unsettled. First, Crowell declined to address whether the 
standard of liability in a breach of warranty claim was strict liability or 
negligence.80 Later appellate decisions and commentary appeared to 
favor a showing by the injured party that the landlord was negligent in 
failing to remedy a defect of which he had notice, but no court ever 
made such a ruling. 81 Second, as Crowell involved an injured tenant, 
the question of whether a lawful visitor who was not a signatory to the 
lease could invoke the implied warranty of habitability to recover for 
is express, consequential damages for injury to the person may be available as a remedy. 
Where the warranty is implied-in-fact, however, consequential damages may not be awarded 
because personal injury is outside the parties' contemplation." Id 
77. See, e.g. , Chiu v. City of Portland, 788 A.2d 1 83 ,  1 88 n.6 (Me. 2002); Auburn v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 435 N.E.2d 780, 782-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 982). 
78 .  386 N.E.2d 1 256, 126 1  (Mass. 1979). The court justified the extension of the 
implied warranty of habitability to personal injury claims with reference to jurisprudence 
pennitting tenants to recover for personal injuries resulting from the previously recognized 
but more limited implied warranty of habitability in short-term rentals of furnished dwellings. 
ld The court remarked that "extension of the warranty [of habitability] to the ordinary 
residential tenancy . . . logically carries with it liability for personal injuries caused by a 
breach." Id 
79. See, e.g., Farris v. Univ. of Mass., No. 04-P-467, 2005 WL 2869 16, at *l (Mass. 
App. Ct. Feb. 7, 2005) (unpublished table decision) (discussing plaintiff's assertion that 
breach of implied warranty of habitability sounded in contract rather than tort and therefore 
Massachusetts Tort Claim Act was inapplicable); Ruiz v. Pelson Realty Trust, No. CIV A. 99-
1 969, 2001 WL 810347, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 200 1 )  ("[W]hen a tenant suffers 
personal injury as a result of a landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the 
landlord's contractual obligation to the tenant requires the payment of compensatory damages 
to the tenant under a strict liability standard."). 
80. Crowell, 386 N.E.2d at 1 261-62. 
8 1 .  See, e.g., Fletcher v. Littleton, 859 N.E.2d 882 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). The 
Massachusetts Academy ofTrial Attorneys filed an amicus brief arguing vociferously in favor 
of a strict liability standard, which would subject the landlord to liability in the absence of a 
violation of a statutory housing code. Id at 885-86 & n.7. The court declined to adopt such a 
standard. Id; see also Jeffrey C. Melick, 'The Standard of Care in Wammty of Habitability 
Cases, 82 MAss. L. REv. 1 8  7, 1 93 (1 997). 
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personal injuries remained.82 Following Crowell, several courts 
extended the warranty to third party claimants, but others declined to 
do so.83 As noted by a leading Massachusetts authority on the warranty 
of habitability, those decisions refusing to extend the warranty of 
habitability to guests and visitors did so by emphasizing the contrac­
tual nature of the claim. 84 
In its 2009 decision in Scott v. GadJeld, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court clarified that the "implied warranty of habitability . . .  
is a multi-faceted legal concept that encompasses contract and tort 
principles, as well as the State building and sanitary codes."85 
According to the court, the contractual nature of the implied warranty 
permits tenants to recover for economic losses resulting from the 
landlord's breach.86 The tort-like nature of the warranty, on the other 
hand, permits both tenants and third parties lawfully on the premises to 
recover damages for personal injuries. 87 The court went on to explain 
that the conclusion that lawful visitors may recover for injuries 
resulting from the landlord's breach of warranty is predicated on 
the expectation that a tenant might invite a guest into his home, and the 
concomitant expectation that the tenant's home must be safe for a guest 
to visit-which together go to the very heart of the landlord's 
contractual obligation to deliver and maintain habitable premises that 
comply with the building and sanitary codes. 88 
Thus, even in authorizing extension of the warranty to protect third 
parties, the court emphasized the contractual aspect of the expectations 
of the parties. Moreover, the court in Scottexplained that although the 
principles of comparative fault are applicable to general negligence 
82. Crowell, 386 N.E.2d at 1259. 
83. See Gifford v. Sears, No. 04 165A, 2005 WL 2373847, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 12, 2005); Ruiz, 2001 WL 810347, at *4; Mitchell-Gionet v. Markowski, No. 930903, 
1994 WL 878955, at *2-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1994); cf. Sullivan v. H.H. Gilbert Mgmt. 
Corp., No. 93-4818, 1 997 Mass. Super. LEXIS 1 3 1  (Mass. Super. Ct. May 16, 1 997); 
Egenlauf v. Brown, No. CA 941 040, 1996 WL 1 1 86833, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 
1996). 
84. See Jeffrey C. Melick, Actions Based on the Wammty of Habita bility, in 
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL LANDLORD-TENANT PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETIS § 7.2.2 
(2009). 
85.  912 N.E.2d 1 000, 1005 (Mass. 2009). 
86. Id 
87. Id Here, the court appeared to draw an analogy between the warranty of 
habitability in lease and the implied warranty of merchantability in sales of goods. See 1d at 
1006; Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Mass. 1983) 
(recognizing product liability claims for personal injuries based on breach of warranty sound 
essentially in tort). 
88. Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1 005. 
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claims, they are inapplicable to breach of implied warranty claims 
under Massachusetts statutory laW.89 At present, Massachusetts is 
alone in its recognition of a hybrid contract-tort theory of recovery for 
personal injuries. In other jurisdictions, it is clear that consequential 
losses of this type are not compensable in contract. 
3. Critique of the American Approach 
A number of anomalies result from the bifurcation of personal 
injury and property damage claims from claims for economic harm. 
First, most American courts permit aggrieved tenants suing in contract 
to recover economic damages only. The measure of damages is 
generally taken as the "difference between the fair rental value of the 
premises if they had been as warranted and as they were during the 
occupation in the unsafe and unsanitary conditions."90 This has been 
"criticized on the ground that a tenant rents a dwelling for shelter, not 
profit, and that tenant's losses, in discomfort and worry over dangers, 
are intangible."91 However, very few courts have recognized the 
possibility of recovery for emotional distress suffered by a tenant.92 
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to entirely foreclose the 
possibility of recovery of any consequential losses in contract, 
relegating claims for consequential damages relating to personal 
injury, property damage, and emotional distress entirely to tort.93 
Such a restriction is artificial and inconsistent with other 
comparable areas of law. First, the view that consequential losses are 
not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting is 
not credible, given that the warranty of habitability is inextricably tied 
89. Id at 1005-06 & n.7 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 23 1 ,  § 85 (West 2000)); 
Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1 033.  The court's holding on the issue of comparative fault is curious. 
The court's conclusion that comparative negligence does not apply to the breach of implied 
warranty of habitability is based upon its previous holdings in the products liability context 
that Massachusetts' comparative fault regime does not apply to claims involving the implied 
warranty of merchantability. See Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1005-06 & n.7 (citing Correia, 446 
N.E.2d at 1033). In the seminal case on that issue, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held 
that the comparative negligence scheme is inapplicable to implied warranty of 
merchantability claims because the standard of care is strict liability, and not negligence. 
Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1 03 9-40. However, in Scott, the court specifically declinedto address 
whether the landlord's standard of care in an implied warranty of habitability case involving 
personal injuries is one of strict liability or negligence. See Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1 006 n.8. 
90. MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 1 0. 1 0 1  (4th ed. 1 997). 
9 1 .  Id 
92. See Simon v. Solomon, 43 1 N.E.2d 556, 561 -62 (Mass. 1982); Fair v. Negley, 390 
A.2d 240, 246 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 209 (Vt. 1984). 
93. See, e.g., 303 Beverly Group, L.L.C. v. Alster, 735 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 (N.Y. App. 
Term 200 1 ); Chiu v. City of Portland, 788 A.2d 183, 1 88 n.6 (Me. 2002). 
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to health and safety standards. Moreover, since 1952, consequential 
awards for injury to both person and property have been explicitly 
recoverable under the Uniform Commercial Code for a seller's breach 
of the contractual warranty of merchantability implicit in sales of 
goods.94 Perhaps more pertinent, given the body of jurisprudence 
distinguishing the lease of a dwelling from the sale of a product,95 the 
Uniform Commercial Code similarly provides for consequential 
damages resulting from injury to person or property in the context of 
leases of goods.96 Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
explicitly provides for the availability of nonpecuniary damages in 
contract claims involving bodily harm.91 The strongest reason for 
relegating claims for consequential losses to tort is the policy-based 
preference against imposing strict liability on landlords. And yet, even 
this rationale is flawed. Although the traditional American view of 
contractual liability is liability without fault,98 fault is not entirely 
foreign to American contract law. 99 
Moreover, the complete removal of claims for consequential 
losses from the realm of contract has unintended consequences. 
Although an injured plaintiff is permitted to cumulate actions in 
contract and in tort under American law, such cumulation of claims 
does not necessarily provide the tenant with full relief One prob­
lematic area concerns a tenant's protection from so called "retaliatory 
eviction" by landlords, or eviction of a tenant in retribution for the 
94. U.C.C. § 2-7 15(2)(b) (2002). The U.C.C. abandons the requirement of 
"foreseeability" in this context in favor of a requirement that the consequential losses for 
injury to person or property be "proximately" caused by the seller's breach. 2 WILLIAM D. 
HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2:7 1 5:6 (201 0). 
95. See infra notes 6 1 -67 and accompanying text. 
96. U.C.C. § 2A-520(2)(b) (2003). As in the sales context, the U.C.C. adopts a 
"proximate cause" requirement rather than a "foreseeability" requirement for damages 
relating to injury to person or property. HAWKLAND, supra note 94, § 2A:520:6. 
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 ( 1 982) ("Recovery for emotional 
disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the 
breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result."). 
This rule has been adopted in most U.S. jurisdictions. See 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:7 & n.2 1 (4th ed. 2002). Note, however, that the 
original Restatement's formulation of the rule required not only bodily injury but also 
''wanton or reckless breach." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 34 1 ( 1982). 
98. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Foreword· Fault in Amen'can Contract Law, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 134 1 ,  134 1  (2009); Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the 
Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TuL. L. REV. 457, 463 ( 1 994); Roy Kreitner, Fault 
at the Contract-Tort Interface, 1 07 MICH. L .  REv. 1 533, 1535 (2009); Eric A. Posner, Fault in 
Contract Law, 1 07 MICH. L. REV. 1 43 1 ,  1436 (2009). 
99. See Posner, supra note 98, at 1431 ("[A)lthough Anglo-American contract law is 
usually called a strict-liability system, it does contain pockets of fault."). See also infra Part 
rvc.2. 
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bringing of an implied warranty of habitability claim.100 Many states 
prohibit such retaliatory eviction either jurisprudentially or by 
statute.101 However, because retaliatory eviction remedies may be 
available only when the aggrieved tenant has brought a contract-based 
warranty claim, and not in connection with a tort-based claim, tenants 
who are physically injured or suffer property damage as a result of a 
defect in the premises are anomalously less protected than those who 
suffer mere inconvenience and out-of-pocket expenses associated with 
reparrs. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska recently addressed this issue in its 
2009 decision in Helfrich v. Valdez Motor Corp. '°2 Following an on­
premises slip and fall that resulted in several days of hospitalization, 
Helfrich, a residential tenant, retained an attorney. 103 The attorney 
issued a demand letter, in response to which the landlord took steps to 
evict Helfrich.104 Helfrich sued, alleging negligence and violation of 
the URLTA's antiretaliation provisions.105 The court rejected Helfrich's 
retaliatory eviction claim on the ground that the statutory protections 
extend only to tenants alleging harm governed by the URLTA. 106 
According to the court, although defective premises may fall within 
the ambit of the URLTA's obligation to maintain the premises, the 
damages claimed by Helfrich were beyond the scope of the statutory 
regime, which deals only with contractual claims. 107 After reluctantly 
holding that a retaliatory eviction claim was unavailable to a plaintiff 
suing in tort for personal injury, the court reflected that "[a]s a matter 
of policy, those tenants are no less worthy of protection from 
retaliation."108 A dissenting Justice decried the result as producing a 
"perverse framework of anti-retaliation protection."109 As observed by 
1 00.  Many states provide such protection via statute. 5 THOMPSON, supra note 7, 
§ 43 .06(a); see, e.g., CAL. C!V. CODE § 1 942.5 (West 201 0); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.64 (West 
20 I 0); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8590(2) (McKinney 2010). The URLTA includes a retaliatory 
conduct provision, § 5 . 1 0 1 .  
J O I .  5 THOMPSON, supra note 7 ,  § 41 .08(a) & nn.483-84. 
I 02. 207 P.3d 552 (Alaska 2009). 
1 03 .  Id at 555. 
1 04 .  Id 
1 05. Id 
106. Id at 558-59. 
1 07. Id at 559. 
I 08. Id at 560. 
I 09. Id at 564 (Winfree, J., dissenting). Several other states have adopted the 
URLTA's anti-retaliation provision, including New Mexico, Tennessee, and Washington. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-39 (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-514 (2010); WASH. REV. 
CODE. ANN. § 59. 1 8 .240 (West 2010). However, not all states' anti-retaliatory eviction 
schemes foreclose tort claimants from invoking protection. For example, Oregon's statute 
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the court, this unjust result is not limited to the URLTA; New York's 
antiretaliation statute, which is not based on the uniform act, likewise 
limits the scope of protection to those tenants exercising contract­
based rights emanating from landlord-tenant legislation.1 10 
III. THE CIVIL LAW REGIME 
Now that the historical evolution of the American approach and 
its theoretical underpinnings have been fully explored, foreign systems 
will be examined to consider how the problem of landlord liability for 
defective premises is dealt with abroad. To this end, the functionalist 
method of comparative law shall be employed. The functionalist 
method is primarily concerned with determining whether different 
legal systems are confronted with a similar legal problem, whether 
those systems have the same or different legal rules to address that 
problem, and whether those rules lead to similar or differing results. 1 1 1 
The aim is to look past terminology, or, in this case, taxonomy, to 
determine whether jurisdictions use common approaches to address 
common problems.1 12 Part III of this Article thus turns to the civil law 
tradition for a study in contrast and similarity. 
A. The Histodcal Approach: Concurrent Liability in Contract and 
Tort 
The civil law approach to the lease is profoundly different from 
the historical approach of the common law. Whereas the common law 
viewed the residential lease primarily as a conveyance, akin to a sale, 
the civil law has long characterized the lease as a contract that transfers 
to the tenant a personal right of use and enjoyment rather than any 
form of "title," as understood in the common law. 1 13 The fundamental 
prohibits retaliation against any tenant who "has performed or expressed intent to perform 
any other act for the purpose of asserting, protecting or invoking the protection of any right 
secured to tenants under any federal, state or local law." OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.385 (West 
20 1 0) .  
1 1 0. Helfrich, 207 P3d at 560 (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 223-b, 235-b 
(McKinney 20 1 O)); see also Pezzolanella v. Galloway, 503 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (Utica City Ct. 
1 986). 
1 1 1 . See John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 6 1 7, 622 
( 1 998). 
1 12. See id at 622-24. 
1 1 3 .  See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3 . 1 1 (A. James Casner ed., 1 952) ("(T]he 
lease is primarily a conveyance, executed as to the lessor at the time the lease is made, to 
which the covenants are merely incidental."); James Gordley, The Common Law in the 
Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 18 15,  1 867 (2000) 
("While the common law leasehold roughly corresponds to the civil law lease, there is a 
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nature of the civil law lease and the principal elements of its governing 
scheme date back to Roman law.114 The Roman law lease was regarded 
as a bilateral contract that transferred to the tenant the mere use and 
enjoyment of the leased premises, not an ownership interest.115 
Modern civil law systems continue to recognize the lease as a contract, 
bilateral in nature, and thus replete with a number of continuing, 
mutually dependent duties on the part of both the parties.116 
At Roman law, one such implied obligation was the obligation of 
repair. The landlord was required to turn the property over to the 
tenant in a state of good repair, and to maintain the premises in good 
condition throughout the term of the lease.117 If the property was not 
fit for the use intended by the parties, the tenant could demand that the 
lease be dissolved. 1 18  The landlord was also liable for damages if the 
tenant suffered harm from an undisclosed defect of which the landlord 
knew or should have known. 1 19 The current civilian approach to the 
fundamental difference. In common law, the lease was conceived not as an on-going contract, 
as it is in civil law, but as the conveyance of an interest in land."); Gerald G. Greenfield & 
Michael Z. Margolies, An Implied Wammty of Fitness in Nonresidential Leases, 45 ALB. L. 
REv. 855, 866 (1981)  ("The crucial difference is that the common law views the lessor's 
obligations as substantially completed on the first day of the lease, whereas the civil law 
views the lease as a continuing bilateral contract whereby each day the lessor must hold out 
the property for the tenant."). 
1 14 .  For a detailed, contemporary discussion of the Roman law of lease, see W.W. 
BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINJAN 498-503 (2d ed. 
1950). 
I 1 5 .  id at 498-99. 
1 1 6. Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 1 13, at 866. In many modem day civil law 
jurisdictions, the tenant acquires a type of real right in the leased premises. See Hugo & 
Simpson, supra note 10, at 302. However, the recognition of this real right does not affect the 
fundamentally contractual nature of the lease. 
1 1 7 . BUCKLAND, supra note 1 14, at 500. 
1 1 8 .  Calm, supra note I 0, at 380. 
I 1 9. BUCKLAND, supra note 1 1 4, at 500. In fact, the question of whether, at Roman 
Jaw, the landlord was liable for consequential damages only when the landlord failed to 
disclose a defect of which the landlord knew or should have known, or whether the landlord 
was liable in the absence of fault, is disputed. Buckland writes that 
(t]he lessor also was liable for culpa levis in relation to the thing, and must 
compensate for damage due to defects, not disclosed, of which he knew or ought to 
have known. If the thing was in such a state that it did not serve for the ordinary 
uses of such things, he was responsible, not on the ground of negligence, but for 
not supplying what he contracted to supply. 
Id at 500. A number of scholars have interpreted the Roman law as requiring a showing of 
fault by the tenant. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND § 3 . 14.12 (R.W. 
Lee trans., 1 936); PITTHIER, CONTRAT DE LOUAGE § 1 1 9 (G.A. Mulligan trans., 1953). 
Modem South African scholars challenge the validity of these conclusions. See, e.g., W.E. 
COOPER, LANDLORD AND TENANT 1 08-09 (2d ed. 1994). The resolution of the question of the 
proper interpretation of the Roman law is beyond the purview of this Article, particularly 
given the position of this Author that regardless of what standard of liability may have been 
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landlord's responsibility for the condition of the premises has changed 
strikingly little since its Roman formulations. Many contemporary 
civilian systems retain the rule that the landlord is required to let the 
property in a condition fit for its intended use and to maintain the 
premises in good repair. 120 
The basis for the landlord's responsibility for the condition of the 
premises is directly tied to the fact that the civilian lease is not a 
conveyance. 121 The civil law has historically recognized the rule of res 
pent domino, according to which the risk of loss or damage to a thing 
is borne by its owner.122 Because the lease entails no transfer of 
ownership, it likewise entails no transfer to the tenant of responsibility 
for damage or deterioration. 123 Thus the landlord remains responsible 
for all repairs and items of damage to the leased thing, except for those 
resulting from the fault of the tenant. 124 
The civil law approach to premises liability in tort likewise has 
roots in the Roman law. According to the Jex Aqwlia de damno, a 
statutory enactment of the third century B.C., the owner of certain 
types of damaged property had a right to compensation from the 
wrongdoer. 125 The Aquilian action was eventually expanded to include 
all negligent property damage and personal injury. 126 In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Natural Law scholars used 
this seed from the Roman law to bring forth the so-called general 
principle of tort responsibility, that everyone is responsible for the 
harm caused by his or her fault.121 This principle lies at the foundation 
of most continental tort regimes.128 Subsumed within the general 
principle is the notion that a person in control of immovable property 
received by a modem civilian or mixed jurisdiction from the Roman law, the standard of care 
imposed on a landlord should reflect a contemporary policy assessment, and not slavish 
repetition of historical norms. See in/Ta. Part TII.B.2. 
1 20. See, e.g., CODE CTVIL [C. crv.] art. 1721 (Fr.); BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] 
[CIVIL CODE] §§ 536-536d (Ger.); MARiA ESTHER BLAS LOPEZ, SPAIN 10, http://www. 
eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/ResearchThemes/EuropeanP 
rivateLaw/TenancyLawProject/TenancyLawSpain.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 20 10) (Spain); 
ANDREAS FURRER & DAVID VASELLA, TENANCY LAW PROJECT-SWISS REPORT 29, http:// 
www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/ResearchThemes/Euro 
peanPrivateLaw/TenancyLawProject/TenancyLawSwitzerland.pdf (last visited Nov. 1 3, 20 1 0). 
1 2 1 .  Palmer, supm note 49, at 28. 
1 22.  See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE CIVIL LAW OF LEASE IN LOUISIANA § 3-6 
( 1 997). 
1 23 .  See id; ParHIER, supm note 1 1 9, § 3-4. 
1 24. See PALMER, supm note 1 22, § 3-6; POTIUER, supra note 1 1 9, § 21 9. 
1 25 .  ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 9, at 291 -92. 
1 26.  Id; Cohn, supm note 1 0, at  395. 
1 27. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 9, at 292. 
1 28 .  Id 
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is liable for injuries caused to another by a dangerous condition on the 
• 129 preffilses. 
In the civil law, as in the common law, the rationale for premises 
liability in tort stems at least in part from the obligor's control of the 
premises. However, unlike the historical common law landlord, the 
civilian landlord is not absolved from tort liability by the mere 
relinquishment of possession of the premises. 130 Rather, although the 
landlord is not technically the occupier of the premises, the fact that 
the landlord is obligated to deliver the premises in good repair and to 
keep them in a safe condition maintains the element of control 
necessary to preserve tort duties to all persons lawfully on the 
premises.111 Thus the landlord's obligation in contract serves indirectly 
as a basis for liability in tort. 
As a general rule, civilian tenants have the ability to cumulate 
their tort claims together with their contract claims, with the effect of 
providing tenants the "best of both worlds." The prominent exception 
falls under the French doctrine of non-cumul, under which a plaintiff 
who has suffered an act that is simultaneously both a breach of a 
contractual obligation and a delictual responsibility may only pursue 
his claim in contract. 132 Other jurisdictions freely permit the 
cumulation of actions regardless of the theory of liability at issue. 
Thus, in most systems of the civilian tradition, tenants may cumulate 
contractual and tort claims to garner the full extent of the benefits of 
each. 
B Modem Van'ations in Mixed Junsdictions 
To illustrate the modem variations on the civilian approach to 
landlord liability, the regimes of three mixed jurisdictions-South 
Africa, Scotland, and Louisiana-will be studied here.133 This analysis 
1 29. See R.G. MCKERRON, THE LAW OF DELICT: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
LIABILITY FOR CIVIL WRONGS IN THE LAW OF SournAFRJCA 240 (7th ed. 1971). 
1 30. See Cohn, supm note 10, at 396. 
1 3 1 .  See id 
1 32. 6 SAUL L!TVINOFF, LOUISIANA CML LAW TREATISE § 1 6.8 (1999). The doctrine 
of non-cumulis adhered to in France and in Belgium. See id 
1 3  3. The mixed jurisdictions studied in this Article are Scotland, South Afiica, and 
Louisiana. Other mixed jurisdictions not explored here include Quebec, Puerto Rico, The 
Philippines, Israel, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, St. Lucia, Mauritius, 
and the Seychelles. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MlxED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE 
THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 4-5 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 2001) [hereinafter PALMER, MlxED 
JURISDICTIONS). Mixed jurisdictions have been described as "fruitful laboratories for 
comparative purposes" due to their unique ability to selectively borrow from either legal 
tradition. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative 
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is useful for a number o f  reasons. First, mixed jurisdictions have been 
lauded for their value in comparative tort analysis, because "[t]ort is 
the area par excellence of common law penetration" in mixed 
systems. 134 Each of the mixed jurisdictions studied here has a tort 
system firmly rooted in the Roman civil law, while at the same time 
heavily influenced by the common law. 135 Thus, the efforts of these 
jurisdictions to deal with the tort aspects of the landlord-tenant 
relationship are directly influential in "pure" common law 
jurisdictions, such as those in the United States. Additionally, while 
the law of South Africa and Scotland was heavily influenced by 
seventeenth-century Dutch scholars, Louisiana law was more heavily 
influenced by French and Spanish sources.136 While the basic elements 
of the law of lease in each of these jurisdictions derives from a 
common source-the Roman law--each jurisdiction's approach bears 
the distinct markings of other, individual influences. Further, each of 
the mixed jurisdictions studied here has a unique history and culture. 137 
Because the observation of common legal trends among diverse 
cultures can be quite telling, an analysis of the level of similarity or 
difference across jurisdictional lines such as these is invaluable.138 
1 .  South Africa 
The legal system in South Africa is a hybrid of civilian Roman­
Dutch law and English common law. 139 However, the legal regime 
governing the landlord-tenant relationship in South Africa is decidedly 
civilian in character. Many of the principles governing the landlord­
tenant relationship are found in the uncodified principles of South 
African law which, even today, are drawn directly from Justinian's 
Digest and the commentaries of such seventeenth-century jurists as 
Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L  L. 41, l 03 (2008); see also VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, 
LOU1SIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MrxEo JURISDICTION 3 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 1 999); 
ZIMMERMANN E T  AL., supra note 8, preface at (vi); REINHARD ZIMMERMANN & DANIEL 
VISSER, SOU THERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 2-3 (1996). 
134. Vernon Valentine P almer, The Fate of the General Clause in a Cross-Cultural 
Setting: The Tort Experience of Louisiana, 46 LoY. L. REV. 535, 535 (2000) ("The subject of 
tor t in a mixed jurisdiction is of the greatest interest to the comparative lawyer and to those 
interested in the modem ius commune."). 
135. See PALMER, MlxEo JURISDICTIONS, supra note 1 33, at 118 (South Africa), 226 
(Scotland), 303 (Louisiana). 
136. Id at 118, 303. 
137. See id at 4. 
138. See id 
139. For a detailed discussion of the history and elements of South African law, see 
H.R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTI! AFRICAN LEGAL SYS TEM AND ITS BACKGROUND 
329-596 (1968). 
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Johannes Voet and Hugo Grotius. 140 Since the 1 920s, residential leases 
have also been subject to a number of statutory controls designed for 
the protection of tenants. 141 These statutes concern issues such as rent 
control and rights of eviction, but do not touch upon the landlord's 
responsibility for the condition of the premises. 142 
According to established principles of Roman-Dutch law, a 
residential landlord owes two interconnected obligations to the tenant 
relating to the condition of the premises: the landlord must first 
deliver the premises in a condition suitable for habitation and must 
thereafter maintain the premises in a condition suitable for 
habitation.143 In fact, the term "habitability" does not make its way into 
the doctrinal writings or case reports involving these obligations. 
Rather, the landlord's obligations are couched in terms of delivering 
and maintaining the dwelling in a condition fit for the purpose for 
which it was let, which in the case of residential lease, means that the 
property must be fit for habitation.144 
The landlord's breach of either the obligation to deliver or the 
obligation of maintenance entitles the tenant to a number of traditional 
contractual remedies, including dissolution of the lease, rent abate­
ment, repair-and-deduct rights, and specific performance.145 However, 
in South Africa, a tenant may only recover consequential damages if 
the landlord either knew or ought to have known of the defect and 
neglected to take reasonable measures to remedy it.146 Though some 
jurisprudence has indicated that a landlord has constructive knowledge 
of defects only when the landlord's trade or profession "renders him an 
1 40. See ge nerally A.J. KERR, THE LAW OF SALE AND LEASE (3d ed. 2004); COOPER, 
supm note 1 1 9; see also HAHLo & KAHN, supra note 1 39, at 578-8 1 .  
1 4 1 .  See ELLISON KAHN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SALE & LEASE 94-97 
( 1 998). 
Afr.).  
142. See Rent Control Act 80 of 1976 (S. Afr.); Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 (S. 
1 43. COOPER, supra note 1 1 9, at 85, 98. 
1 44. See 1d at 85. 
145. Id at 85-90. Although a lessee may in theory compel a lessor to place or 
maintain the premises in good condition, South African courts (under the influence of 
English law) hold that as a general rule an order of specific performance will not be granted 
against a lessor. The justification advanced for this rule is that it would be difficult for a court 
to enforce its order. This trend has been criticized by a leading commentator as inconsistent 
with South African law. Id at 89. 
146. Id at 90; see also Hunter v. Cumnor Invs. 1952 ( 1 )  SA 735 (CPD) at 741 (S. Afr.) 
("[T]he authorities appear to have intended to fix the lessor's liability on the basis of a neglect 
on his part. It is the knowledge of the defect on the part of the lessor coupled with a failure 
by him to remedy the defect that fixes him with liability. Mere knowledge, but with no 
opportunity to act on that knowledge towards the remedying of the defect, would not render 
the lessor liable for damage flowing from the unremedied defect."). 
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expert in matters related to building," other case law has suggested that 
a landlord derives constructive knowledge "from the nature of his 
occupation, or from the other circumstances."141 In either case, a tenant 
must essentially prove negligence on the part of the landlord before 
recovering consequential damages on the contract, including damages 
resulting from personal injury or property damage. 
This negligence requirement appears to have originated in the 
writings of seventeenth century European scholars interpreting the 
relevant provisions of Roman law. 148 The accuracy of these 
interpretations has been questioned by modern South African 
scholars. 149 More importantly, these same commentators have 
questioned the continuing theoretical validity of the fault-based rule.150 
One contemporary justification for the negligence approach rests on 
the ground that under South African law, liability for positive 
malperformance-that is, failure to perform a contractual obligation, 
whether express or implied by law-requires a showing of fault.151 
Although contractual liability is usually thought of as strict in nature, 
an obligor may avoid liability on a showing that his breach of contract 
was the direct result of the act of a third party or a force beyond his 
control.152 Thus, the fault requirement for recovery of consequential 
damages resulting from a landlord's breach of the repair obligation is 
justified on the ground that fault requirements exist throughout South 
African contract law. 153 Another justification for the fault requirement 
is made by analogy to the context of sales, in which sellers are liable 
for defects in things sold to the extent they know or should know of the 
defects.154 South African commentators have challenged both of these 
justifications.155 Despite criticism of the fault requirement, courts 
continue to require a showing of fault before a tenant is permitted to 
147. Compare Hunter, 1 952 ( 1 )  SA at 744, with Nannucci v. Wilson & Co. 1 894 (4) 
SC 233 (SC) at 234 (S. Afr.). This more lenient view is favored by modem commentators. 
See COOPER, supra note 1 19, at 1 1 0 & n.82 (citing KERR, supra note 140, at 2 1 4). 
148. See COOPER, supra note 1 1 9, at 108-09. The rule appears to have originated from 
the writings ofUlpian in the Digest. See id (citing DIG. 1 9.2. 19. l  (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 32)). 
149. See id; Andrew Domanski, Consequential Damages in Lease: Gingerly 
Sidestepping Authority, 104 SAU 3 1 1 ,  3 1 1-12 (1 987). 
1 50. Domanski, supra note 149, at 3 1 1-15.  
1 5 1 .  J.G. Lotz, Lease, in 14 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA § 146 CVV.A Joubert, ed. 
1 98 1  ); A.D.J. Van Rensburg et al., Contract, in 5 THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 1 5 1 ,  
para. 22 1 .  Positive malperformance is contrasted with negative malperformance, which is the 
failure to perform contractual obligations in a timely manner. Van Rensburg et al., supra. 
1 52. Van Rensburg et al., supra note 1 5 1 ,  at para. 22 1 .  
1 53. Id 
154. See COOPER, supra note 1 1 9, at 109 & n.76. 
1 55. See id at 1 09-10. 
20 1 0] LANDLORD LIABILITY 441 
recover consequential damages.156 Strikingly, the issue of whether 
fault-based or strict liability is more desirable from a contemporary 
policy perspective appears to have been all but completely ignored.157 
In addition to the action in contract, an aggrieved tenant may 
bring a tort claim against a landlord for damages resulting from a 
defect in the premises. South African law recognizes that owners and 
occupiers of land and buildings owe a general obligation to take 
reasonable care for the safety of persons who lawfully come onto the 
property. 158 As a general rule, the owner of property is responsible for 
its condition on the basis that the owner exercises control over the 
premises.159 But even when the premises are let, the landlord's 
obligation to maintain the premises in a safe condition constitutes 
sufficient control over the premises to subject the owner to tort 
liability, though the landlord is not in possession of the premises.160 
Thus, the landlord owes to the tenant the duty to keep the premises "as 
safe for [the purpose of the lease] as reasonable care and skill on the 
part of any one can make them."161 Similarly, the landlord owes an 
obligation of reasonable care to third parties who are lawfully on the 
• 162 premises. 
Very few reported cases involve claims for consequential 
damages arising from breach of the landlord's contractual obligations. 
The paucity of litigation on this issue may stem from the fact that 
South African law generally prohibits recovery of nonpecuniary 
damages in breach of contract claims and instead relegates recovery of 
so-called general damages-that is, damages for pain and suffering-
1 56. See, e.g., Fourie NO v. Hansen & Another 2001 (2) SA 823 (WLD) at 826; 
Minette Nortje, Law of Lease, 2001 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 270, 272-73 (2001). 
1 5 7.  See, e.g., Domanski, supra note 149, at 3 12: 
Strict liability would, no doubt, be harsh on the lessor in certain circumstances, but 
the exploration of that issue falls outside the scope of this note. Suffice it to say 
that, in practice, most lessors would be well able to protect themselves, either by 
the insertion of an appropriate clause in the agreement of lease or by way of 
insurance. 
The tendency to focus on the historical and theoretical accuracy of the rule may be explained 
in light of the fact that in South Africa, many legal writings from centuries past are still 
routinely utilized in modem dispute resolution. See Zimmermann, supra note 8, at 4 (noting 
that here, "legal history and modem legal doctrine have not categorically been 'thought 
apart"'). 
1 58 .  McKERRON, supm note 129, at 240. 
1 59.  Id 
1 60 .  See 1d; Cape Town Municipality v. Paine l 923 SA 207(A) at 209-10  (S. Afr.). 
1 6 1 .  McKERRON, supm note 1 29, at 241 (quoting Maclenan v. Segar [1 917] 2 K.B. 
325 at 333 (Eng.)). 
1 62. See 1d at 242. 
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to the province of tort law.163 Thus, although theoretically a tenant may 
seek redress for personal injuries under a contract theory, damages will 
be limited to recovery of pecuniary losses, such as out-of-pocket 
medical expenses. Moreover, because the tenant is required to make a 
showing that the landlord was negligent in failing to deliver or 
maintain the premises in a safe condition, the tenant does not have the 
benefit of a more favorable standard of liability on the contract claim. 
Additionally, because the statute of limitations applicable to claims in 
both contract and tort is three years, the contract theory does not afford 
a longer period of time in which to sue.164 
The only benefit of the contract action, from the tenant's point of 
view, concerns the defenses the landlord can raise to prevent or reduce 
the tenant's recovery. In the contractual setting, the principle of volenti 
non fit mjun8-essentially, assumption of the risk-applies to entirely 
bar the plaintiff's recovery. 165 In order to successfully invoke this 
defense, the landlord must meet the difficult burden of proving that the 
tenant clearly consented to the risk of injury. 166 In the tort setting, the 
analysis of the plaintiff's behavior is more complex. Contributory 
negligence applies in suits involving tort responsibility predicated on 
negligence, and therefore, the behavior of the tenant may serve to 
reduce the percentage of fault allocated to the landlord.167 Contributory 
negligence has thus far been restricted to the tort context in South 
Africa, and is not applied to contractual claims.168 However, at least 
some commentators espouse the view that comparative fault should 
apply to any contractual breach that is predicated on the defendant's 
fa.ult 169 As articulated by one author, the application of comparative 
1 63. J.R. DU PLESSIS & L. KOK, AN ELEMENTARY INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW: A GUIDE FOR BEGINNERS 95 (2d ed. 1 989); A.J. KERR, THE PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 607-08 (4th ed. 1989); Cohn, supra note 10, at 395 & n.91 
(quoting R.G. MCKERRON, THE LAW OF DELICT 22 (3d ed. 1 947)). 
164. Prescription Act 68 of 1969 § 1 1  (S. Afr.). 
165. COOPER, supra note 1 19, at 1 1  l .  
1 66. See, e.g, Tee v. Mcilwraith, 1905 ( 19) EDC 282 at 289 (S. Afr.); Anlln v. 
Ebrahim, 1926(47) NLR I at 7 (S. Afr.). 
1 67. l PQ.R. BOBERG, THE LAW OF DELICT 652-53 ( 1984). 
168. Id at 656. The Supreme Court of Appeal most recently addressed this issue in 
Thoroughbred Breeders '  Ass1.l v. Price Watemouse 2001 (4) SA 55 1 (SCA). According to 
the court, the Apportionment of Damages Act was specifically designed to alter the effect of 
contributory negligence and the last opportunity rule, both of which were completely 
unknown to the South African law of torts. Id Therefore, "the Act was designed to address 
and correct a particular mischief that was identified as such within the law of delict . . .  it was 
confined to that particular mischief; and that the corresponding problem . . . might arise 
within the law of contract was never within the legislature's compass." Id at 590. 
1 69. See SA Law Commission Project 96 The Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 
1956, § 4. 122 (July 2003) (S. Afr.), http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj96_report_ 
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fault in the contract context "should be . . . all the more necessary in 
the light of the recent tendency to 'blend' contractual and delictual 
liability."110 Thus a plausible argument may be made by a landlord in 
an appropriate case for the extension of comparative fault principles to 
temper a tenant's recovery in contract. Such a case has not yet been 
decided. 
Given that courts are reluctant to find sufficient evidence of 
consent to apply the doctrine volenti n on fit injuria to bar a tenant's 
claim, the tenant's likelihood of success may be greater in an action on 
the contract. On the other hand, given that the tenant may not recover 
for nonpecuniary losses for pain and suffering in an action on the 
contract, and that the standard of care and statute of limitations are 
identical in both tort and contract, a tenant has little incentive to utilize 
a contractual theory of recovery when a tort theory is concurrently 
available. 
An additional distinction between tort-based and contractual 
theories of recovery is the respective availability of each theory to third 
parties who are not signatories to the lease. An action for breach of 
contract exists only in favor of the tenant.111 Therefore, family 
members or guests of the tenant who are injured due to the landlord's 
breach of contractual obligations must pursue their claims in tort 
alone. 172 
The South African approach to landlord liability for defective 
premises is characterized by rigid maintenance of the line of 
demarcation between contract and tort. This staunch separation, 
coupled with the particular attributes of tort and contract under South 
African law, has led to the marked underutilization of the contract 
theory of recovery for consequential losses resulting from breach of 
the landlord's obligation to deliver and maintain the premises in a 
tenantable condition. 
2. Scotland 
Scotland's mixed legal system, like that of South Africa, was 
initially heavily influenced by the Roman-Dutch law as articulated by 
2003jul .pdf; BOBERG, supra note 1 67, at 713 ;  Louise Tager, General Pdnciples of Contract, 
1976 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 67, 87-88 ( 1976); McKERRON, supra note 129, at 248; P.Q.R. 
Boberg, LawofDelict, 1965 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 174, 1 79-80 ( 1965); Jean Davids, Altered 
Cheques: Apportionment of Loss, 82 SALJ 289 (1965). 
170. BOBERG, supra note 1 67, at 713 ;  see also M.M. Loubser, Concurrence of 
Contract and Dehct, 8 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 1 13, 1 37 (1997). 
1 7 1 .  McKERRON, supra note 1 29, at 241 .  
1 72. Id at 24 1-42. 
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authorities such as Grotius and Voet. 173 And, as i n  South Africa, many 
tenets of the landlord-tenant relationship are governed by an 
uncodified body of case law and doctrinal writings.114 A number of 
statutes designed to impose additional obligations on landlords not 
recognized under the Scottish common law have also been enacted 
within the past century.175 
The Scottish land law imposes an implied obligation on the 
landlord to deliver the premises to the tenant in a condition reasonably 
fit for 'the purpose of the lease.176 In the case of urban tenancies, 
fitness for use translates to a requirement that the premises be wind­
and water-tight, and in a reasonably habitable or tenantable 
condition.177 Moreover, the jurisprudence has further developed the 
notion of habitability and has tied the concept to human safety. As 
articulated by the Court of Session of Scotland, the landlord's 
obligation "include[ s] seeing that there [is] no part of the subjects in a 
condition likely to endanger the tenant."118 If the landlord fails to 
deliver the premises in a fit condition, the tenant can repudiate the 
lease or demand a reduction in the rent. 119 Scottish landlords also owe 
a continuing duty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition 
throughout the lease term.180 If the tenant discovers a defect, the 
landlord is given a reasonable time in which to repair it. 181 If the 
landlord fails to do so, the tenant is entitled to dissolve the lease or 
claim an abatement of rent.182 In either case, the tenant may claim 
damages.183 
A unique aspect of the Scottish approach is that the standard of 
care imposed depends on whether the landlord failed to deliver the 
premises in a habitable condition, or whether the landlord failed to 
maintain the premises in a habitable condition. In the former case, the 
landlord is strictly liable for the tenant's losses regardless of whether 
1 73. Zimmennann, sup.m note 8, at 9-10. 
1 74. Seeid 
1 75.  See Housing (Scotland) Act, 1987, c .  26; Housing (Scotland) Act, 1 988, ch. 43; 
Housing (Scotland) Act, 2001 (A.S.P. I O); The Landlord's Repairing Obligations (Specified 
Rent) (Scotland), 1988, S.I. 1 988/21 55. 
1 76 .  WILLIAM M. GORDON, SCITTTISH LAND LAW 572 (2d ed. 1 999); G. CAMPBELL H. 
PATON & JOSEPH G.S. CAMERON, THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANf IN SC<ITLAND 130 
( 1967). 
1 77. GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 572. 
1 78. Lamb v. Glasgow Dist. Council, (1 978) S.L.T. 64, 64 (Scot.). 
1 79. PATON & CAMERON, supra note 176, at 132. 
1 80. GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 572; PAJDN & CAMERON, sup.m note 176, at 131-32. 
1 8 1 .  PATON & CAMERON, supra note 1 76, at 1 32. 
1 82. Id 
1 83 .  Hugo & Simpson, supra note 1 0, at 3 1 7-18.  
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the landlord knew or should have known of the defect causing harm.184 
In the latter case, however, a landlord's liability has long been 
considered conditioned upon actual or constructive knowledge of the 
defect at issue.185 In other words, a landlord is liable for harm arising 
from a later-arising defect only if it is one of which the landlord knew 
or should have known, and was negligent in failing to repair. The 
notice requirement for later-arising defects is justified on the ground 
that the landlord is not in possession of the premises, and thus should 
not be held liable for defects for which no practical means of discovery 
exists.186 
The common law obligations of landlords in some classes of 
urban housing have been supplemented by statutes over the course of 
the last century. 181 The statutes provide that the contract of lease shall 
include an implied condition that the house is "in all respects 
reasonably fit for human habitation," both at the commencement of the 
tenancy, and during the lease.188 Like the common law obligation, the 
statutory obligation is tied to human safety. A recent Court of Session 
opinion confirmed the long-held interpretation of the statutory 
criterion as follows: "If the state of repair of a house is such that by 
ordinary [use,] damage may naturally be caused to the occupier, either 
in respect of personal injury to life or limb or injury to health, then the 
house is not in all respects reasonably fit for human habitation."189 As 
under the common l aw, the landlord is strictly liable for defects that 
existed at the time of leasing, and only upon notice during the 
pendency of the lease. 1 90 Thus, with respect to the definition of 
habitability and the standards of care, the common law and statutory 
obligations mirror each other. The primary benefit of the statutory 
1 84. 13  THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCWPAEDIA § 254 (Sir 
Thomas Smith et al. eds., 1992). 
1 85. PATON & CAMERON, supra note 176, at 1 32. 
1 86. Todd v. Clapperton, (2009] CSOH 1 12 [ 1 14]; (2009) S.C. 1 1 2, 1 14 (Scot.). 
1 87. GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 573. 
1 88. Housing (Scotland) Act, 1 987, c. 26, sch. I 0, iJ 1(2). The statutory repairing 
obligations apply to tenancies with a weekly rental of at least £300 per week and a term of 
less than three years. Id; The Landlord's Repairing Obligations (Specified Rent) (Scotland), 
1 988, S.l. 1988/2 1 55. Most residential leases in Scotland are initially made for periods much 
shorter than three years. Tenants who remain on the premises after the expiration of the initial 
term usually do so through tacit relocation. In these circumstances, the statutory obligations 
still apply. See Comm on Law Tenancy Rights, SHELTER SCOTLAND, http://scotland.shelter. 
org. uk/getadvice/advice_topics/rentin�rights/common_law _tenancies/common_law _tenanc 
y_rights (last updated July 23, 2010). 
1 89. Todd, [2009) CSOH at 1 14; (2009) SC at 1 14 (quoting Summers v. Salford Corp. 
[ 1 943) A.C. 283 (H.L.) 289 (appeal taken from Eng.)). 
1 90. Id 
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scheme is that the obligations it imposes are not waivable,191 in contrast 
to the common law obligations, which can be freely altered by the 
parties.192 
Under the Scottish common law, only the tenant is protected by 
the landlord's contractual obligations relating to the condition of the 
premises. Family members and guests of the tenant have no 
contractual recourse against the landlord for failure to deliver the 
premises in a condition fit for habitation or to effect necessary 
repairs.193 However, landowners have always owed tort duties of care to 
others under Scottish law. Initially, the obligation was a general duty 
of care.194 In 1929, the House of Lords imposed on Scotland the 
English classifications of invitees, licensees, and trespassers, and the 
varying duties owed to each.195 This change was met with sharp 
criticism and was ultimately overturned with the enactment of special 
legislation reinstating a standard of reasonable care. 196 This legislation 
specifically subjects landlords to the same standard of care as 
landowners in possession of their premises.197 Thus, landlords are 
liable in tort not only to tenants, but also to any person lawfully on the 
• 198 prerruses. 
For several reasons, whether a tenant seeks recompense under a 
tort or contract theory is largely irrelevant. First, the tenant is entitled 
to recover nonpecuniary losses, including damages for pain and 
suffering, in contract as well as in tort.199 Although contractual 
I 9 I .  Housing (Scotland) Act I 987, sch. I 0, ii I (2). By way of exception, the parties 
may petition the sheriff to approve the exclusion or modification of statutory obligations, 
which may be granted if the sheriff is satisfied that the proposed modification is reasonable. 
Id ii 5. 
I 92. GORDON, supra note 1 76, at 572. 
193.  DAVID M. WALKER, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS IN 
ScOTLAND 450 (3d ed. I 995); Cameron v. Young (1907) S.C. 475, 476-77 (Scot.). However, 
one commentator has opined that the statutory repair obligations protect "not merely tenants 
but those whom a landlord should reasonably foresee might use the house." DAVID M. 
WALKER, THE LAW OF DELICT IN SCOTLAND 596 (2d ed. 198 I) [hereinafter WALKER, DELICT]. 
194. WALKER,DELICT, supra note 193, at 579. 
195.  Id 
196.  Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act, I 960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 30, §§ 1-2. 
1 97. Id § 3. 
I 98. At one time, Scottish jurisprudence held that the tenant was protected only by 
contract and not by the law of tort. WALKER, DELICT, supra note 1 93, at 596-97; see, e.g., 
Proctor v. Cowlairs Coop. Soc'y Ltd. ( 1961) S.L.T. 434, 434. This view was met with some 
criticism, and today is obsolete, as the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 protects "any 
persons who or whose property may from time to time be on the premises." Occupiers' 
Liability (Scotland) Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 30, § 3(1 ). 
199. See Eric Clive & Dale Hutchison, Breach of Contract, in MlxED LEGAL SYSTEMS, 
supra note 8, at 184-85; SCOITISH LAW COMMISSION, DISCUSSION PAPER ON REMEDIES FOR 
201 0] LANDLORD L IAB ILITY 447 
recovery for mere mental distress is a relatively new phenomenon in 
Scottish law, contractual claims for pain and suffering damages 
associated with personal injury date back over one hundred years.200 In 
fact, the earliest cases permitting contractual recovery for personal 
injuries involved either breaches of the landlord's repair obligations or 
of the seller's warranty of fitness.201 Second, the statute of limitations 
applicable to causes of action for personal injury is three years, 
regardless of whether the action is founded in contract or in tort.202 
Claims for damage to property must be made within five years, again 
regardless of the theory of liability.203 Thus a tenant gains no distinct 
advantage by suing either in tort or on the contract, and with regard to 
the type of damages recoverable or the period of time during which 
suit may be brought, the contractual claim of the tenant and the tort 
claim brought by a spouse or on behalf of a child are indistinguishable. 
On the other hand, the contractual and tort actions differ signifi­
cantly in two key respects. First, as discussed above, the landlord is 
strictly liable in contract for defects existing at the time the leased 
premises is delivered to the tenant. Thus, the applicable standard of 
care may significantly affect whether a tenant, on the one hand, or a 
child or spouse, on the other, may recover for an injury caused by such 
a defect. Second, the defenses available to the landlord in the 
contractual realm are quite different from those available in the tort 
realm. A tenant's contractual claim is barred entirely by the doctrine of 
volenti non fit inju.ria. Thus, if a tenant is injured by a defect of which 
the tenant is aware or which is obvious, recovery is entirely barred.204 
More specifically, the prevailing jurisprudential rule is that a tenant 
who continues to occupy the premises in the presence of a known 
defect cannot recover unless that continued occupation rests on a belief 
that repairs will be carried out immediately.205 This rule is predicated 
BREACH OF CONTRACT para. 8.23 (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.scotlaw.gov.uk/down 
load_file/view/92/. 
200. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Contracts of Intellectual Gratification-A Louisiana­
Scot!and Creation, in MIXED JURJSDICTIONS COMPARED: PRrvATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND 
SCOTLAND 208, 219-20 (Vernon Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009). 
20 I .  See, e.g., Cameron v. Young, (1907) S.C. 475, 475-80 (Scot.); Dickie v. Amicable 
Prop. Inv. Bldg. Soc'y ( 19 1 1 )  S.C. 1 079, 1083-84 (Scot.); Fitzpatrick v. Barr, ( 1 948) S.L.T. 
( Sh. Ct.) 5, 5 (Scot.). 
202. Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act, 1973 § 1 7(1  )(a). 
203. Id § 6 & sch. 1 .  
204. PATON & CAMERON, supra note 176, at 132. As stated by one court, "[T]he law 
does not hold a landlord of house property to be in the position of an insurer of the safety of 
his tenants." Meehan v. Watson ( 1 906) S.C. (Sh. Ct.) 28, 30 (Scot.). 
205. PAlDN & CAMERON, supra note 176, at 132. 
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on the view that a tenant who discovers a dangerous defect in the 
premises should "repudiate the lease and go to live elsewhere."206 In 
contrast, in a tort suit brought by a nontenant, such as a tenant's family 
member or a guest, the doctrine of contributory negligence applies, 
and the plaintiff's recovery may be lessened proportionately based 
upon the failure to take reasonable care to avoid the risk ofharm.201 
By virtue of these differences, the injured tenant has a much 
stronger claim than a third party such as a family member or 
roommate. In a case in which the defect involved arose prior to the 
delivery of the leased premises, a tenant's claim would lie in strict 
liability, while that of a spouse, child, or guest would lie in negligence 
alone. Further, regardless of the standard of care involved, the tenant's 
claim is subject to bar only when the tenant "freely and voluntarily, 
with full knowledge of  the risk he ran, impliedly agreed to incur it."208 
In contrast, a claim by a nontenant is much more likely to be reduced, 
perhaps to a great extent, by evidence establishing the less onerous 
standard of failure to take reasonable care.209 
Perhaps more than in other jurisdictions, the distinction between 
the tenant's claim and that of a family member is not merely academic. 
In Scotland, the most litigated claims by tenants concerning the 
condition of the premises involve asthma contracted either by the 
tenant or, more frequently, the tenant's children, as a result of 
dampness and condensation.210 Any disadvantage to the child's claim 
206. Hughes' Tutrix v. Glasgow Dist. Council, ( 1982) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 70, 72 (Scot.). 
207. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1 945, C. 28, § 1 ( 1 )  (Eng.). 
208. Morton v. Glasgow City Council, (2007) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 8 1 ,  84 (Scot.) 
(distinguishing contributory negligence from the doctrine volenti non fit injuria). 
209. Fascinatingly, the assumption of risk defense may apply to the tenant's action 
even ifthe tenant sues in tort. This is because the statute specifically authorizing tort liability 
for landlords contains a provision that appears to retain the defense. Occupier's Liability 
(Scotland) Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 30, § 2(3) ("Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this 
Act shall be held to impose on an occupier any obligation to a person entering on his 
premises in respect of risks which that person has willingly accepted as his; and any question 
whether a risk was so accepted shall be decided on the same principles as in other cases in 
which one person owes to another a duty to show care."); see Hughes 'Tutrix, (1 982) S.L.T. at 
72-74. One commentator suggests, however, that in the tort action, "only clear evidence of 
voluntary acceptance of specific known risks . . .  could be sufficient to make the maxim 
applicable." WALKER, DELICT, supra note 193, at 348. 
2 1 0. GORDON, supra note 176, at 573; STIRLING HOWIBSON, HOUSING & ASTHMA 1 82-
84 (2005); Court Action If Disrepair ls Damaging lliur Health, SHELTER SCOTLAND, http:// 
scotland.shelter.org.uk/getadvice/advice_topics/repairs_and_bad_conditions/taking_court_act 
ion_over_repairs/court_action_if_disrepair_is_damaging_your_health? (last updated July 23, 
201 0). 
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stemming from its classification as tort-based rather than contractual is 
difficult to justify. 21 1 
In sum, Scotland, much like South Africa, retains a relatively 
staunch line between the contractual and tort claims against landlords 
for defective premises. However, whereas in South Africa, the 
differences between the theories are not highlighted due to the 
infrequency of contractual claims, in Scotland, where contractual 
claims are more prevalent, the differences are underscored and thus 
more noticeably call for reconsideration. 
3. Louisiana 
Louisiana enjoys its status as a mixed jurisdiction due to the fact 
that while much of its private law originated in French and Spanish 
sources, it also has been heavily inundated with American influences.212 
Louisiana's law of lease is similar to that of the French Civil Code, and 
though it was extensively revised in 2005, it continues to reflect many 
of the same concepts as the Roman law.213 Unlike most modem 
jurisdictions (whether civil, common, or mixed), Louisiana does not 
employ a special statutory regime under which residential leases are 
govemed.214 Thus the residential lease is governed primarily by the 
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code.215 
Drawing from the Roman law, the Louisiana Civil Code imposes 
significant obligations on the landlord with respect to the initial 
suitability and the continued maintenance of leased property. The 
landlord is required to deliver the thing in a condition "suitable for the 
purpose for which it is leased," which, in the residential context, 
2 1 1 .  Although the unavailability of the strict liability theory to children is troublesome, 
it should be noted that contributory negligence is rarely assessed against children, and the 
contributory fault of a parent is not applied to the detriment of the child's action for recovery. 
Hughcs ' Tutrix,  (1982) S.L.T. at 74-75; WALKER, DELICT, supra note 193, at 368. 
2 1 2. Vernon Valentine Palmer, T1ro Worlds in One: The Genesis of Lowsi ana s Mixed 
Legal System, 1803-1812, in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MlxED JURISDICTION 23-39 
(Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 1 999). 
2 1 3 . Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual S ources and 
Present R elevance, 46 TuL. L. REv. 4, 43 ( 197 1) ;  Paul du Plessis, Of Mice (and Other 
Disasters) and Men-Rent Abatement Due to Unforeseen and Uncontrollable Events in the 
Civilian Tradition, 17 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 1 13, 1 35, 1 38, 149 (2002). 
2 1 4. This is the case despite the call for such a regime by the academic commentary. 
See Palmer, supra note 49, at 3 8 .  
2 1 5 .  Various ancillary statutes relating t o  residential leases are found i n  the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes, Title 9. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3221 ,  324 1 ,  325 1-54, 3258-3259.2, 
3 260-6 1 (20 1 0). With one exception discussed infra at notes 230-234 and accompanying 
text, none of these provisions addresses the landlord's obligation to maintain the premises. 
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translates to habitation.216 The landlord is also required to maintain the 
habitability of the premises through the making of necessary repairs to 
the premises,211 and warranting against vices or defects which may 
arise during the pendency of the lease.218 The landlord's failure with 
respect to any of these obligations may entitle the tenant to obtain 
dissolution of the lease,219 as well as to claim actual and consequential 
damages resulting from a landlord's failure to perform.220 A landlord's 
breach of the repair obligation may also entitle the tenant to demand 
repairs or to make repairs and deduct the amount expended from the 
rent provided the repairs were necessary and the amount expended 
reasonable.221 The addition of the ''warranty" against vices and defects 
in Louisiana law, which does not appear in either Scotland or South 
Africa, adds an additional level of analysis to a landlord's liability.222 
The landlord's standard of care in warranty is one of strict liability, 
given that the landlord is liable to the tenant even in the absence of 
knowledge of the defect or any negligence in failing to discover it.223 
Notably, under current law, the parties may not contractually alter 
the warranty against vices and defects in residential leases if that 
waiver would insulate the landlord from liability for defects that 
"seriously affect health or safety" or in cases involving physical 
injury.224 The statutory restriction against waiver is new and was added 
2 16. LA. C!v. CODE ANN. art. 2684 (2010). 
2 1 7. Id art. 2691.  
2 1 8. Id art. 2696. 
2 19. Id art. 27 19; GEORGE M. ARMSTRONG, LOUISIANA LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW 
§ 7 . 1  (1 992). 
220. LA. CIY. CODEANN. art. 1994; ARMSTRONG, supra note 219, § 7.22. 
22 1 .  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2694; ARMSTRONG, supra note 219, § 7.22. 
222. The warranty derives immediately from the French Civil Code, which is itself 
drawn from the writings of Pothier. John C. Morris, Jr., Comment, Lessor's Liability for 
Personal Injuries, 7 LA. L. REv: 406, 407 ( 1947). The French Civil Code provides: 
A warranty is due to the tenant for all vices or defects of the thing leased which 
prevent use of it, although the lessor did not know of them at the time of the lease. 
Where any loss results to the lessee from those vices or defects, the lessor is 
obliged to indemnify him. 
CODE CML [C. crv.] art. 172 1  (Fr.); see also POTHIER, supra. note 1 1 9, §§ 109-120. However, 
the imposition of strict liability on the landlord for consequential loss does not necessarily 
follow from Pothier's treatise. PonIIER, supra note 1 19, § §  1 1 8-120. Some commentators 
have observed that the strict liability standard adopted in the French Civil Code represents a 
departure from the Roman law requirement of fault for consequential loss. See Cohn, supra 
note 10, at 38 1 .  
223. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2697 ('The warranty . . .  also encompasses vices or 
defects that are not known to the lessor."); see, e.g., Freeman v. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 95-
0243, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 0/26/95); 663 So. 2d 5 1 5, 5 1 9. 
224. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2004(2), 2699(2)-(3). 
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during the 2005 overhaul of the law of lease in recognition of the fact 
that most Western jurisdictions, whether common law or civilian, 
prohibit waivers of obligations relating to habitability in residential 
leases.225 Prior to the 2005 revision, Louisiana courts were reluctant to 
uphold waivers of the landlord's repair obligations.226 Although 
restrictions on contractual waivers are contrary to the general principle 
of contractual freedom, Louisiana courts recognized that residential 
tenants have relatively little bargaining power and are therefore 
deserving of protection from the possibility of an unfair imposition of 
a contractual waiver of their rights.221 Another effect of the 2005 
revision was the extension of contractual protection in warranty 
beyond the confines of privity to "all persons who reside in the 
premises in accordance with the lease."228 This new provision clearly 
extends the protection of contractual privity to family members as well 
as roommates who are not related by blood or marriage.229 
Although guests of the tenant do not receive the benefit of the 
contractual scheme, landowners have always owed tort obligations to 
protect the public from harm resulting from dangerous conditions on 
the premises.230 This obligation stems not from the so-called "general 
clause," according to which everyone is liable for whatever damage is 
caused by fault, but instead comprises a special type of tort liability 
governing damage caused by the ruin of a building.231 Under the 
applicable provisions of law, the owner of a building is liable for any 
"damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to 
repair it, or when it is the result of a vice or defect in its original 
construction."232 
This liability was at one time strict in character, but recent tort 
reform initiatives have reduced the standard of care in tort to one of 
negligence, so that now an owner is only liable for damages which 
could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, but were 
not.2·13 As a result, under current law, the landlord's liability to the 
225. See 1d art. 2699 cmt. g (2005). 
226. ARMSTRONG, supra note 2 19, § 7.21. 
227. Id (citing Moity v. Guillory, 430 So. 2d 1 243 (La. Ct. App. 1983)). 
228. LA. Ctv. CODE ANN. art. 2698; ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNING, LoUISIANA 
l.A.W OF SALE AND LE ASE: A PRECIS § 3 . 1 .2 (2007). 
229. Prior to the revision, Louisiana courts were split on the issue of whether the 
tenant's family and guests could recover under a contractual breach of warranty theory or 
whether their claims were relegated to tort. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 219, § 8.5 1 .  
230. LA. Ov. CODE ANN. arts. 23 17, 23 17. l ,  2322. 
23 1 .  Compare id. art. 23 1 5  with id. arts. 23 17, 23 1 7  . 1 ,  2322. 
232. Id art. 2322. 
233 .  1996 La. Acts I § 1 .  
452 TULANELA W REVIEW [Vol. 8 5 : 4 1 3  
tenant and others residing at the premises lies in strict liability, while 
liability to others lawfully on the premises lies in negligence only.234 
The distinction between a landlord's liability in contract and in tort 
does not end with the standard of care, however. Louisiana retains a 
bifurcated limitation of claims scheme under which contractual actions 
are subject to a limitations period of ten years, while tort claims are 
b . D5 su �ect to a mere one year. 
The line between contract and tort in Louisiana is not so bright, 
however; the intermingling of tort and contract concepts is seen in 
several important instances. In the strict contractual setting, that is, 
when a tenant demands dissolution of a lease or economic damages for 
failure to effect repairs, the meaning of a "defect" is tied to the "cause 
of the contract."236 In other words, if the defect prevents the leased 
premises from being used as intended by the parties, then the defect is 
actionable. When a tenant seeks contractual recovery for personal 
injuries, however, dangerousness and the foreseeability of injury have 
been factored in to determine whether the cause of the injury was in 
fact a compensable "defect."237 Here, the very meaning of the term 
"defect" is derived from the law of tort.238 Thus, whether a tenant 
pursues a personal injury claim under a contract or tort theory of 
recovery, the central question is whether the defect at issue presents an 
unreasonable risk of harm that can be anticipated through normal use 
of the premises.239 Occasionally, courts even employ the doctrine of res 
234. Driscoll v. Provenzano, 01 -1 1 15,  p.l (La. 6/1/0 1 ); 793 So. 2d 201 ,  201 (Calogero, 
CJ., concurring); Barnes v. Riverwood Apartments P'ship, 38,33 1 ,  pp. 6-7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 
417104); 870 So. 2d 490, 494-95 (finding that tort reform legislation reducing tort standard of 
care to negligence did not impact strict liability standard of care applicable to landlords in 
contract). 
235. Compare LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3499 (applying ten-year prescriptive period to 
personal actions, including contracts) with art. 3492 (applying one-year prescriptive period to 
tort actions). Louisiana's prescription regime has been criticized as both complex and 
inequitable. See Benjamin West Janke, The Failure of Louisiana s Bi!Urcated Liberative 
Prescription Regime, 54 LOY. L. R.Ev. 620, 672 (2008). 
236. PALMER, supro note 1 22, § 3 . 1 7. 
237. Id; ARMSTRONG, supro note 219, § 8.21 .  
238 .  PALMER, supro note 122, § 3 . 18 . 
239. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1 134, 1337-38 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 1984) (finding lessor's liability for vices and defects analyzed in terms of negligence 
because the result is "the same"); see also Barnes, 38,33 1 at p. 5 n.3; 870 So. 2d at 494 n.3; 
Freeman v. Julia Place Ltd. Partners, 95-0243, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95);  663 So. 2d 
5 1 5, 5 19; Zanders v. Lambert, 5 14 So. 2d 617, 619 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1987); Ivey v. Hous. 
Auth. of Mansfield, 5 14 So. 2d 66 1 ,  663-64 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1 987); Wood v. Cambridge Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1 129, 1 1 32 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1 986); Gallagher v. Favrot, 499 So. 2d 
1205, 1 207-08 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1 986). 
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jpsa loquitur in the contract setting to find a presumption of 
defectiveness that must be rebutted by the landlord.240 
Recovery for breach of the landlord's tort obligations clearly 
extends to nonpecuniary damages such as those for pain and 
suffering.241 And, in the contract setting, courts have awarded 
nonpecuniary damages stemming from a tenant's anxiety, worry, and 
loss of time occasioned by the defect.242 Whether personal injury 
damages are recoverable in the contract setting is less clear. The 
jurisprudence tends to deal with personal injuries in the lease setting 
under the rubric of tort.243 However, many of the cases deal with 
personal injuries to tenants' family members, who lack contractual 
privity with the landlord, and before the 2005 revisions could not 
recover on a breach of warranty theory. Thus, the past tendency of the 
courts to apply a tort theory to third-party claims is not necessarily 
indicative of any reluctance to award nonpecuniary damages on the 
contract in the proper case. Even in those cases involving physical 
injury to the tenant rather than a third party, the courts ' utilization of a 
tort theory does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of contractual 
recovery in this context, since the tenant has both tort and contract 
theories at his disposal. 
The Louisiana Civil Code generally restricts recovery in contract 
for nonpecuniary loss to a small subset of contracts. Nonpecuniary 
damages are allowed when the contract, due to its nature or the intent 
of the parties, is intended to "gratify a nonpecuniary interest" of the 
obligee so long as the obligor either knew or should have known of 
that interest.244 The Louisiana Supreme Court has made clear that the 
240. See, e.g., Keller v. Kelly, 378 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 979), writ 
denied, 380 So. 2d 624 (La. 1980). 
24 1 .  See, e.g, Davis v. Hochfelder, 95 So. 598, 599 (La. 1923) (delict); Breen v. 
Walters, 91 So. 50, 52-53 (La. 1922) (delict); Badie v. Columbia Brewing Co., 77 So. 768, 
771 (La. 1918) (delict); Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 72 So. 5 13, 5 14-1 6  (La. 1916) 
(delict); Warren v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 190 So. 855, 858 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1939) (delict). 
242. See, e.g., Gennings v. Newton, 567 So. 2d 637, 642 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990); Smith 
v. Castro Bros., 443 So. 2d 660, 661 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 983). 
243. See, e.g, Davis, 95 So. at 599; Breen, 91 So. at 52-53; Badie, 77 So. at 771 ;  
Boutte, 72 So. at 514-16; Warren, 190 So. at 858. 
244. LA. Crv. CODE.ANN. art. 1998 (2010) provides: 
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, because of its 
nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, because of the 
circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, 
the obligor knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would cause 
that kind of loss. Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be 
recovered also when the obligor intended, through his failure, to aggrieve the 
feelings of the obligee. 
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nonpecuniary interest of the obligee must be "significant."245 
Prototypical examples of this type of contract include those for the 
tailoring of a wedding dress,246 funerary services,247 and nursing care 
services. 248 One line of cases bearing directly on residential tenancy 
involves contracts for the sale or repair of homes. In this line of 
decisions, Louisiana courts have awarded nonpecuniary damages to 
litigants who successfully allege that the contract for sale or repair was 
made in order to fulfill the ''American Dream" of home ownership, or 
the home was characterized as the owner's "dream home."249 Applying 
these decisions by analogy, in the proper case, a residential tenant may 
seek nonpecuniary damages for emotional distress resulting from the 
landlord's breach of his contractual obligations of maintenance. 250 One 
Louisiana court of appeal has gone so far as to suggest that all 
residential leases involve nonpecuniary aspects, stating: "A lease for 
residential purposes includes, as one of its objects, the enjoyment of 
habitable living quarters, arguably a nonpecuniary interest."251 
The sale and repair line of decisions does not, however, address 
whether pain and suffering damages resulting from personal injury are 
awardable on a contract theory. Louisiana's experience with personal 
injury damages in the products liability setting is  instructive here. 
Under early products liability jurisprudence, a buyer injured by a 
defective product was entitled to sue for damages in both tort and 
contract.252 The case law initially required an injured buyer to bring a 
contractual claim for contractual remedies and a tort claim for personal 
injuries suffered.253 Later cases upheld contractual awards for 
245. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1 123, 1 1 33-34 (La. 1 992). 
246. Lewis v. Hohnes, 34 So. 66, 68 (La. 1903). 
247. Robinson v. Providence Mausoleum, Inc., 359 So. 2d 1 3 1 7, 13 18  (La. App. 4 Cir. 
1978). 
248. Free v. Franklin Guest Home, Inc., 463 So. 2d 865, 874 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1985). 
249. See, e.g., Heath v. Brandon Homes, Inc., 36, 1 84 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/02); 825 
So. 2d 1262; Austin Homes, Inc. v. Thibodeaux, 01-1282 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/8/02); 82 1 So. 2d 
IO; Thomas v. Desire Cmty. Hous. Corp., 98-2097 (La. App. 4 Cir. 711 9/00); 773 So. 2d 755; 
Mayerhofer v. Three R's Inc., 597 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1 992); Ditcharo v. Stepanek, 
538 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1 989). 
250. However, in at least one case, a Louisiana court has refused to allow a tenant 
suing on a breach of contract theory to recover mental anguish damages in the absence of 
physical injury. Gele v. Markey, 379 So. 2d 763, 764-65 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1979). 
25 1 .  Ganheart v. Exec. House Apartments, 95-1278 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/1 5/96); 67 1 So. 
2d 525. 
252. See, e.g., Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 3 1 0  (La. 1980) (original 
hearing). 
253. See id at 3 12. The Louisiana Supreme Court eventually held that a seller's 
breach of contractual obligations relating to defective products gives rise to tort and 
contractual damages. Id at 3 1 9  (rehearing). 
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nonpecuniary losses due to the concurrence of tort and contractual 
liability in the products liability context. 254 Under current law, recovery 
for physical injuries is made solely under the provisions of the 
Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA); recovery for economic loss 
h 255 N 
· 
may only be sought on a contractual t eory. o statutory regnne 
similar to the Louisiana Products Liability Act governs defective 
premises, and thus concurrence of tort and contract claims is still 
permitted. Therefore, the pre-LPLA jurisprudence permitting recovery 
for nonpecuniary losses in contractual actions involving significant 
tort aspects, such as personal injuries, could readily be applied to the 
lease context by analogy. 
The availability of fault-based defenses to the tenant's claim in 
contract further muddles the line between contract and tort. The 
Louisiana Civil Code provides for the reduction of the tenant's 
recovery in the event that the tenant is injured by a defect that was 
known to the tenant but the tenant failed to report to the landlord.256 
However, Louisiana courts have long looked beyond the statutory 
notice requirement to tort principles to apply comparative fault to a 
tenant's claim.257 In so doing, courts have reduced a tenant's recovery 
upon a showing that the tenant knew of the defect, that the premises 
could have been used safely with the exercise of reasonable care, and 
that the tenant failed to use such reasonable care.258 The negligence or 
fault of the tenant is not an absolute bar to the tenant's recovery, but 
serves to decrease the tenant's recovery proportionally in relation to the 
tenant's own fault.259 Since 1984, the Louisiana Civil Code has 
specifically provided for the application of comparative negligence in 
the contractual realm, through a provision stating, "If the obligee's 
negligence contributes to the obligor's failure to perform, the damages 
are reduced in proportion to that negligence."260 More broadly, since 
1996, article 2323 of the Civil Code has sanctioned comparative fault 
254. Robert E. Landry, Note, Lafleur v. John Deere Co.: No Recovery of Delictual 
Damages for the Sale of a Useless Produc� 48 LA. L. REV 183, 198 (1987). 
255. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52 (2010). 
256. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2697 (2010). 
257. McGinty v. Pesson, 96-850, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/ 1 1 /96); 685 So. 2d 54 1,  
545. 
258. Id 
259. Wood v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1 129, 1 133  (La. App. 2 Cir. 
1986). Prior to Louisiana's adoption of comparative fault in 1979, some Louisiana courts 
applied principles of contributory negligence to the tenant's contractual claim against the landlord. See, e.g, Phillips v. Duplantis, 353 So. 2d 335, 336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1 977), wdt 
denied354 So. 2d 1375 (La. 1978). 
260. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2003. 
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for "any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death, or 
loss," providing additional legitimacy to the defective premises 
jurisprudence.261 
Finally, the tort and contract aspects of the landlord's 
responsibility for the condition of the premises have been conflated in 
cases involving contractual waivers of landlord liability. Before 
introduction of the tort reform initiatives that relaxed the landlord's tort 
liability to a negligence standard, special statutory protections were 
enacted to protect landlords from strict liability in tort. 262 The relevant 
legislation provided that if the tenant contractually assumed responsi­
bility for the condition of the premises, the landlord could be held 
liable only in the event of negligence.263 Although this legislation was 
initially designed to shield landlords from liability in tort, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court applied it in an unanticipated manner to 
contractual liability as well.264 When the landlord's tort standard of 
care was reduced to negligence in the 1 990s, this special legislation 
was not repealed, thus preserving it for continued application in the 
contractual realm. However, the 2005 revisions to the law of lease 
introduced a scheme governing waivers of contractual liability without 
repealing or revising the existing legislation. 265 As a result, conflicting 
261 .  Id art. 2323. Some debate exists regarding the proper application of article 2323. 
The article appears in Title V of Book III of the Civil Code, entitled "Obligations Arising 
Without Agreement." The article's placement would appear to limit its application to the 
realm of tort. However, the plain language of the article extends its reach to "any action" for 
damages, presumably including contractual actions. The effect of article 2323 in the 
redhibition context is currently unsettled. See Aucoin v. S. Quality Homes, LLC, 07-1014, 
pp. 10-1 1 & n. 12 (La. 2/26/08); 984 So. 2d 685, 693 & n.12 (declining to resolve the debate). 
262. P. Ryan Plummer, Comment, Personal Injury and the Louisiana Law of Lease, 64 
LA. L. REv. 177, 179-80 (2003). 
263. See 1932 La. Acts 1 18. 
264. SeeTassin v. Slidell Mini-Storage, Inc., 396 So. 2d 1 26 1 ,  1263-64 (La. 198 1). 
265. See LA. CIY. CODE ANN. art. 2699 cmt. (h). Comment (h) attempts to address the 
competing legislation, stating as follows: 
Civil Code Article 2699 (Rev. 2004) deals with the contractual obligations between 
the parties rather than with the delictual or quasi-delictual obligations that one 
party may incur vis a vis the other party, or vis a vis third parties. Consequently, 
Civil Code Article 2699 (Rev. 2004) does not supersede the provisions of R.S. 
9:3221 which provides for delictual or quasi-delictual obligations incurred as a 
result of injury occurring in the leased premises. 
Id However, the accuracy of this comment is highly questionable. R.S. 9:3221 is broadly 
worded, referencing "iajury caused by any defect," so that it appears to encompass both 
contract and tort liability. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:322 1 (2010). Relying on this broad 
language, the Louisiana Supreme Court has applied RS. 9:3221 to the contractual setting. 
See Tassin, 396 So. 2d at 1264. Moreover, when article 2699 was introduced in 2005, the 
language "Notwithstanding the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code 2699" was added to R.S. 
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legislation now prohibits such waivers in cases involving physical 
injury or defects that "seriously affect health or safety," and yet 
simultaneously protects landlords under such waivers so long as they 
do not act negligently. 266 
In summary, Louisiana's contractual approach to landlord liability 
for defective premises stands out as unique among the jurisdictions 
studied here. The contractual approach is at once both different from 
the tort model and yet infiltrated by tort concepts. In cases involving 
the recovery of personal injury damages, under both theories of 
recovery, the definition of actionable "defects" is identical, principles 
of comparative fault apply, and nonpecuniary losses are compensable. 
However, because the standard of liability and prescriptive period are 
so much more favorable to the tenant in contract than in tort, it cannot 
be said that in Louisiana the two theories are entirely converging. On 
the other hand, the disparity between the theories has been strongly 
tempered by the expansion of the contractual protections to include 
tenants' family members and roommates under the protection of 
contract. 
IV. RECASTING AS CONTORT 
Parts II and ill of this Article traced the common law's 
"bifurcated" approach to landlord liability for defective premises and 
explored the "concurrent" approaches employed in South Africa, 
Scotland, and Louisiana. This Part now examines the comparative 
lessons that can be derived from the similarities and differences 
observed. First, although the common law and civil law regimes 
studied here employ different frameworks for assessing landlord 
liability, the approaches are highly consistent. In the jurisdictions 
studied here, a tort-based action is available both to tenants and 
tenants' family members and guests who are injured by a landlord's 
negligence in failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition. And, 
in the jurisdictions studied here, a contract-based action is available to 
tenants who wish to repudiate their lease and demand a reduction in 
their rent, reimbursement for repairs, or other economic relief. Thus, 
although the gap separating caveat lessee from dual liability in contract 
and in tort was once wide, the common law's recent reformation of 
landlord-tenant law has done much to bridge the chasm. 
9:3221 ,  thus evidencing an intent for the revised statute to maintain undisturbed despite the 
addition of new waiver requirements in the civil code. 2004 La. Acts. 82 l .  
266. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2699; cf LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 9:3221 (2010). 
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Second, the extension of the contract-based action to 
consequential losses has been problematic in all jurisdictions. In the 
United States, the desire to maintain the separation between contract 
and tort has resulted in an artificial "lopping off" of all consequential 
damages in contract. And yet, the concurrent approach espoused by 
the civil law suffers from its own disadvantages. Specifically, 
contractual privity, coupled with the distinctions between the two 
theories of recovery, produces inequities between tenants, who are 
signatories to the lease, and nontenants, who are not parties to the 
contract. Additionally, categorical rules governing the role of fault in 
contract exacerbate the disparity between the two causes of action. 
Finally, the availability of nonpecuniary damages is complicated by the 
often strict rules governing awards of such damages in contract. 
These observations lead to the conclusion that landlord liability 
for defective premises is best characterized as a hybrid liability 
consisting of elements of both contract and tort. Recognizing the 
inherently mixed nature of landlord liability for defective premises, 
and recasting the landlord's obligation as contort, would eliminate 
many injustices currently inherent in both the common law 's bifurcated 
approach and the civilian approach of concurrence. Moreover, a 
conceptually clearer cause of action would emerge. 
A. The Notion of Contort 
Although the distinction between contract and tort may seem 
elementary at first blush, it has been observed that "[t]he 
determination of the borderline between contract and delict is among 
the most difficult of legal problems."261 Many celebrated works 
treating tort law at the macro level have explored, as an initial question, 
the line of demarcation between the two types of liability.268 Numerous 
grounds for distinction have been advanced-some superficial, others 
less so. At the most basic level, contract and tort differ in that contract 
involves the act of human will to be bound by certain legal 
consequences, whereas tort imposes legal consequences regardless of 
an actor's will to be bound in such a manner. 269 A correlate of this 
267. Daniel N. Mettarlin, Contractual and Delictual Responsibility in Quebec: The 
Rediscovery of Contract, 8 McGILL L.J. 38, 38 (1961). 
268. See, e.g., KEE10N ET AL., supra note 27, § 92; McKERRON, supra note 1 29, § 2-5; 
Andre Tune, Introduction to 1 1  INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1 9-29 
(Andre Tune ed., 1983). 
269. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 3; WT. Tete, Tort Roots and Ramifications of the 
Obligations Revision, 32 LOY. L. REv. 4 7, 54 (1986). 
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precept is the closely related notion that obligations in tort are owed by 
an actor to the world at large, whereas contractual obligations are 
generally owed only to those in whose favor they have been voluntarily 
assumed. 210 
The distinction between contract and tort blurs, however, when an 
actor breaches a voluntarily asswned contractual duty that is identical 
or closely related to one otherwise owed to the world at large 
regardless of the existence of contract. 211 These difficult cases arise 
with such frequency that modem scholars have coined new terms, 
including the term "contort," to describe the phenomena.212 The 
terminology may be academic, but the consequences are not.273 The 
distinction between obligations arising from tort and those arising from 
contract are numerous, and significant. Characterizing a claim as 
arising from either tort or contract can affect the standard of liability, 
available defenses, and the type and scope of available damages, 
among many other important substantive and procedural consequences 
of classification.214 In cases involving contorts, a party often vies for 
the classification whose attributes most strongly favor his case, or may 
270. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 2 1 .  There are, of course, limited exceptions to 
this rule. For example, in both civil and common law jurisdictions, contractual obligations 
can be assumed for the benefit of third parties, in the form of a third-party beneficiary 
contract or stipulation pour autmi. See ZWEIGERT & KbTZ, supra note 9, at 145-50 
(referencing BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 328(1) and Code civil [C. 
crv.] art. 1 1 2 1  (Fr.)); WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37: 1 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing doctrine of 
third-party beneficiaries in the United States); ROBERT MERKIN, PRIVITY OF CONTR ACT, 
Preface (2000) (addressing the effect of the Contracts (Rights ofThird Parties) Act 1999 on 
the doctrine of privity in England). 
271.  Indeed, scholars of the civil and common law tradition alike have long studied the 
boundary between contract and tort in these difficult cases, with the overwhelming 
conclusion that the lines of division are illusory, arbitrary, and largely unsatisfactory. See 
generally WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED 
TO PICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1 954). 
272. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 95-98; Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 43. Another term, 
"uncontract," has been coined to describe contractual liability that arises in the absence of 
express agreement. Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational 
Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139, 1 39-41 (1988). The landlord's contractual liability 
for defective premises can, in the usual case, be considered uncontractual in nature, given that 
the obligation is implied, rather than expressly negotiated. 
273. PROSSER, supra note 27 1 ,  at 422. 
274. See Galligan, supra note 98, at 476-81 .  In addition to the differing consequences 
discussed here, others include the capacity or discernment required to obligate oneself, the 
potential for vicarious liability, the availability of specific performance, applicable burdens of 
proof, and such procedural issues as jurisdiction and venue. See KEETON ET A L., supra note 
27, at 665-76; Tony Weir, Complex Liabilities, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 
268, ch. 1 2, at 1 1 -45; Galligan, supra note 98, at 476-81 ;  Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 7-16; 
Tune, supra note 268, at 27. 
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even seek a combination o f  attributes by arguing that he should be 
permitted to sue under both theories. 
The problem of whether a litigant should be able to cumulate 
theories of recovery and thus gain the "best of both worlds" is 
addressed differently across jurisdictional lines.275 In France, for 
example, the doctrine of non-cumul operates to require a litigant to 
bring his claim in contract where a contractual theory of recovery 
exists, thus barring any claim in tort. 216 In the United States, the 
approach is less clear. Generally, courts permit litigants to "elect" 
remedies when an issue of procedural law is at stake. 277 Even when 
substantive law is at stake, but the claim involves damages to property 
or pecuniary interests, litigants are generally permitted to choose the 
theory of recovery.218 However, claims involving personal injury are, 
by and large, relegated to tort,219 while claims involving pure economic 
loss are generally relegated to contract. 280 
Each of the various approaches to cumulation has its own 
limitations and pitfalls, in response to which some wider-ranging 
solutions have been advanced. 281 One proposed solution to the problem 
of contort is a complete merger or unification of tort and contractual 
liability. 282 The historical dichotomy of contract versus tort has come to 
be viewed in some ways as an outdated, formalistic means of 
understanding law.283 Also, because the distinctions between contract 
and tort often vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in an apparently 
arbitrary manner, it is difficult to justify the continuous maintenance of 
separate categories.284 This apparently extreme approach has not been 
well-received, primarily because of the recognition that contract and 
tort remain :fundamentally different in some important respects, 
particularly with regard to the values that each realm seeks to 
advance. 285 Whereas contract law seeks primarily to foster private 
275. For a comprehensive review of approaches taken by numerous jurisdictions in 
both the common law and civil law traditions, see Loubser, supra note 1 70. 
276. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 19-20. 
277. KEETON ET AL., supra note 27, at 666. 
278. Id 
279. Id at 666-67. 
280. Loubser, supra note 1 70, at 1 19. 
2 8 1 .  Seeid at 123-25. 
282. See Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 48; Tune, supra note 268, at 27. 
283. See Weir, supra note 274, ch. 12  at4-5. 
284. See id; Olivier Moreteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone Between Contract and Tort: 
The Role of Estoppel and Reliance in Mapping Out the Law of Obligations, in TORT AND 
INSURANCE LAW YEARBOOK: EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004, at 67 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. 
Steininger eds., 2005). 
285. See Tune, supra note 268, at 27-28. 
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economic relationships and to protect the economic expectations of 
contracting parties, tort law seeks primarily to prevent individuals from 
causing injury to others and to compensate victims of unlawful 
harm.286 
A less radical approach than the total merger of contract and tort 
is the unification of the legal regimes that govern their litigation. This 
approach is favored by scholars who recognize the theoretical 
distinction between the categories of contract and tort, but still 
advocate a merging of the rules governing the two theories in order to 
prevent the anomalous, inefficient, and sometimes unjust outcomes 
observed in claims involving contorts.287 Several jurisdictions have 
attempted to close entirely the divide between contract and tort. 
Czechoslovakia, for example, adopted a uniform regime for tortious 
and contractual liability in 1950.288 Also in Senegal, contract and tort 
are treated under a common scheme. 289 Most recently, France has 
begun the process of reforming its law of obligations with an eye 
toward unifying treatment of contractual and extra-contractual 
liability. 290 
In a more limited fashion, the Civil Code of Quebec provides that 
the same types and extent of damages are recoverable whether liability 
lies in contract or in tort.291 Additionally, numerous jurisdictions today 
provide for uniform periods of limitation governing claims in contract 
and tort.292 A recent example of such unification hails from France, 
where 2008 reforms unified prescriptive periods for contractual and 
extra-contractual liability.293 Under the revisions, a general five-year 
prescriptive period applies to all personal actions, whether based in 
contract or in tort, while a ten-year period applies to all actions in 
286. Loubser, supra note 170, at 1 14-18; see also Daniel A. Farber & John H. 
Matheson, Beyond Promjssory Estoppel- Contract Law and the "Invis1ble Handshake, "52 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 903, 905 (1985) (describing the function of the doctrine of consideration). 
287. See KEETON ET AL., supm note 27, at 655; Litvinoff, supm note 14, at 48; 
Loubser, supra note 170, at 1 14-18. 
288. SeeTunc, supra note 268, at 12-14, 29. 
289. See id. at 29. 
290. Olivier Moreteau, France, m TORT AND INSURANCE LAW YEARBOOK: EUROPEAN 
TORT LAW 2005, at 270, 271 (Hehnut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2006). 
291 .  Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991 ,  c. 64, arts. 1457, 1458, 2922 (Can.). 
292. See Janke, supra note 235, at 657-64 (detailing the uniform prescriptive periods of the Republic of Seychelles, the Czech Republic, Quebec, Iraq, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Russia, Scotland, South Africa, and Switzerland, among other jurisdictions). 
293. Loi 2008-561 du 17 juin 2008 portant reforme de la prescription en matiere civile [Law no. 2009-561 of 17  Jwie 2008, Reforming Civil Prescription], Recueil Dalloz (D.) 
2008, 2512; Olivier Moreteau, France, m TORT AND INSURANCE LAW YEARBOOK: EUROPEAN 
TORT LAW 2008, at 264 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2009). 
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compensation of bodily injury, again regardless of the source of 
liability.294 France's act of abandoning all distinctions between contract 
and tort in the context of prescription has been heralded as a "step 
towards European harmonization."295 
The sweeping approach of unification is the exception rather than 
the rule, however. More commonly, contorts are addressed on a case­
by-case basis. Either legislation or jurisprudence will create a scheme 
for a specific problem in contort to downplay the friction resulting 
from its location at the seam of these two separate spheres of the law.296 
For example, in the realm of legal malpractice, where the claim of an 
aggrieved client is tied both to the contractual relationship of the 
parties and the attorney's failure to exercise due care, American courts 
have adopted uniform rules that do not depend on doctrinal 
classification to govern problematic issues such as the appropriate 
statute of limitations and the timing of accrual. 297 Following this 
national trend, Louisiana has adopted a statutory prescriptive period 
for legal malpractice actions that is entirely divorced from the general 
limitations periods applicable to tort and contract claims.298 A similar 
unified scheme has been adopted for medical malpractice actions.299 In 
some jurisdictions products liability is similarly treated in order to 
reduce the friction between contract and tort.300 The distinction 
between contract and tort is also frequently set aside in harmonization 
efforts, such as the European directive of 1985 on product liability, 
which provides solutions in general terms and avoids references to 
contract or tort. 301 Such ad hoc unification o f  the regimes applicable to 
294. CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] arts. 2224, 2226 (Fr.). 
295. Moreteau, supm note 293, at 266. 
296. See Tom Hadden, Contract, Tort and Cnme: The Forms of Legal Thought, 87 L. 
Q. R.Ev. 240, 269-70 (197 1 ); Tune, supra note 268, at 22, 25-29. Sometimes, the particular 
scheme that is fashioned consists of a blend of contract and tort principles; in other cases, the 
chosen scheme reflects a preference for one regime over another. See Galligan, supm note 98, 
at 502. Thus, for example, in England and the United States, medical malpractice is often 
treated as tort even though the patient and the doctor may enjoy a contractual relationship. 
See PS. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 287, 287 (1986). 
297. See Jonathan M. Albano, Contorts: Patrolling the Borderland of Contract and 
Tort in Legal MalpmcticeActions, 22 B.C. L. REv. 545 (198 1 ). 
298. LA . REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5605 (2010); see Galligan, supm note 98, at 477-78 
(noting that accounting malpractice is treated similarly in Louisiana). 
299. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628; see Litvinoff, supra note 14, at 34-35 (noting that 
the shortened prescriptive period (one to three years) is consistent with contract, but statutory 
caps are consistent with contract). 
300. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.5 1 to .60; CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] arts. 1386-1 
to - 1 8  (Fr.). 
301 .  Moreteau, supm note 284, at 67. 
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individual contorts may be the most direct, efficient, and politically 
viable solution to the overlap of contract and tort. As is the case for 
legal malpractice, medical malpractice, and products liability, the term 
"contort" properly characterizes landlord liability for defective 
premises due to its placement at the intersection of contract and tort. 
An expedient remedy for the difficulties inherent in the landlord's dual 
and overlapping obligations, then, is unification of the two disparate 
regimes. 
B. Landlord Liability as Contort 
In many ways, contract is a poor home for the landlord's liability 
for defective premises, even where tenants seek traditional contractual 
relief, such as damages for economic loss in the form of rent 
abatement and reimbursement for repairs.302 The contract model is 
even less appropriate when a landlord's breach of the obligation of 
habitability results in personal injury or property damage to the 
tenant.3°3 The regulatory nature of this implied, often mandatory 
obligation gives it a tort-like character, as does its tie to the tenant's 
physical comfort and safety. 
Whenever the law implies contractual obligations in a regulatory 
manner to protect one party from the abuses of another regardless of, 
or even in spite of, the implied will of the parties, the line between 
contract and tort blurs.304 This is the case with the residential landlord's 
obligation to maintain the premises. Although the parties intend to 
voluntarily bind themselves to the contract of lease, it cannot be 
credibly asserted that the implied warranty of habitability parallels the 
subjective intention of the landlord. Rather, the law implies the 
warranty of habitability in order to regulate the landlord's behavior­
not in order to fulfill the parties' subjective intent. This is particularly 
true in the United States, where the implied warranty of habitability 
302. See Smith, supra note 38, at 5 1 6- 1 8  ("The warranty concept might legitimately 
have been applied to latent defects in existence when the lease was entered into (or possession 
transferred), but could not apply to a duty to maintain the premises arising thereafter. The 
tenn 'warranty' signifies a person's representation of a state of facts that exist at the time the 
representation is made, and clearly is not synonymous with a promise that a person will do 
something in the future . . . .  "). 
303. Indeed, in the United States, when cases involving personal injuries and property 
damage resulting from breaches of the warranty of habitability began winding their way 
through the courts, several commentators remarked on the difficulties involved and proposed 
solutions. See, e.g., Browder, supra note 25, at 99; Michael J. Davis & Phillip E. DeLaTorre, 
A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as Affected by Uze Wammty of Habitability, 59 WASH. L. 
REv. 141 (1984); Love, supra note 1 8, at 1 12-58. 
304. SeeTtulc, supra note 268, at 25. 
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was implemented as a device to protect residential tenants­
consumers with little bargaining power who are perceived to be in 
need of and deserving of protection.305 The fact that the warranty does 
not validate an implied understanding between landlords and tenants, 
but mandates minimum housing standards as a form of consumer 
protection, smacks not of contract, but of tort. 
The existence of an implied contractual term is, of course, not 
enough to push the landlord's obligation to maintain the premises from 
the contractual realm completely into the realm of tort. Implied terms, 
or suppletive terms, as they are known in the civil law, abound in the 
realm of contract. Nor is the protective nature of the warranty of 
habitability and its civil law cousins determinative. The very terms 
"warranty" and "guaranty," which are frequently employed in strictly 
contractual relations, derive from a term that means "protection" (the 
German gewiihren).306 But the landlord's obligation to maintain the 
premises has evolved into more than a mere suppletive term of 
contract. The law heavily restricts the parties' ability to waive the 
implied obligations of the landlord relating to the condition of the 
premises in Louisiana, Scotland, and the common law jurisdictions of 
the United States. These restrictions on contractual waivers serve a 
regulatory function in that they are predicated on the belief that tenants 
lack sufficient bargaining power to protect themselves contractually 
and thus ought to be protected by the state. 307 In South Africa, the 
constitutional right to adequate housing serves a similar :function.308 
The hybrid nature of landlord liability for defective premises does 
not stem only from the fact that the contractual obligation has its 
source in tort-like consumer protection regulation. Landlord liability 
305. In fact, the implied warranty of habitability was first imported into American law 
specifically to create a right in the tenant to withhold rent or to avoid the lease completely in 
the event the housing was shown to be substandard. See Smith, supra note 38, at 506. As 
discussed above in Part II, infra, these remedies were not available under the common law, as 
a direct result of the doctrine of independent covenants, even when the landlord specifically 
assumed a contractual obligation to maintain the premises in good repair. 
306. Barry Nicholas, Rules and Terms-Civil Law and Common Law, 48 Tm,. L. REv: 
946, 950 ( 1974). 
307. See George M. Armstrong, Jr., & John C. LaMaster, The Implied Wammty of 
Habitability: Louisiana Institution, Common Law Innovation, 46 LA. L. REv. 1 95, 2 14- 1 5  
( 1985). 
308. The South African Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights has 
noted: "Adequate housing must be habitable, in terms of providing the inhabitants with 
adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to 
health, structural hazards, and disease vectors. The physical safety of occupants must be 
guaranteed as well." Mpange v. Sithole 2007 (6) SA 578 (W) at 593 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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for the condition of the premises retains firm footing in contract law. 
The residential lease-both at civil and common law-is an ongoing, 
bilateral contract in which rent is exchanged in return for not merely 
possession of the premises, but also assurance that the premises will 
remain safe and livable. The inherently contractual nature of the 
landlord's responsibility is underscored by the United States' 
experience with its initial adoption. Adoption of a contract model 
permitted American courts to construe the obligations of the landlord 
and the tenant as mutually dependent, which provided a mechanism by 
which an aggrieved tenant could either repudiate the lease, suspend 
payment of rent, or demand specific performance.309 These traditional 
contract remedies were viewed as indispensable to achieve the socially 
desirable goal of tenant protection and safety.Jl0 
In addition, the tort obligations of landlords in all of the studied 
jurisdictions indirectly tie back to this contractual responsibility. In 
both the civil law and the common law, tort liability for defective 
premises is predicated upon control-the ability to take action to 
prevent unreasonable risks of harm.311 In the lease context, the 
landlord's contractual duty relating to the condition of the premises 
maintains the requisite control to justify imposition of tort liability. In 
the United States particularly, widespread recognition of the implied 
warranty of habitability caused tort immunities for landlords to give 
way entirely to a new requirement of reasonable care.312 Thus, the very 
existence of the contractual obligation, which provides the requisite 
control, gives rise to the obligation in tort. 
C Benefits of Recasting as Contort 
Recasting landlord liability for defective premises as a single, 
hybrid liability in contort touches upon every aspect of an injured 
party's claim, from the initial question of who can sue, to the 
determination of the existence and extent of the landlord's liability, to 
the ultimate determination of damages. This Part explores the impact 
that recasting would have on premises liability law in the American 
common law as well as in civilian jurisdictions. 
309. See Javins v. First Nat'! Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 ,  1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Smith, supra. note 38, at 505-34. 
3 1 0. See Smith, supra. not.e 3 8, at 5 15. 
3 1 1 .  See discussion supra. Parts II.A., III.A. 
3 1 2. See Davis & DeLaTorre, supra.note 303, at 154-60. The element of"control" has become a factor in the question of whether the landlord has exercised reasonable care. Id at 157. 
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The most cogent ground for recasting landlord liability for 
defective premises as contort is the fact that continued demarcation 
between contract and tort theories of liability results in disparate 
treatment for tenants, who are signatories to the lease and protected by 
contract, and nontenants, who are nonsignatories to the lease and thus 
protected only in tort. Lawmakers in jurisdictions where separate tort 
and contract remedies lie should consider whether it makes sense to 
provide varying levels of protection to the tenant, family members, and 
guests. 
In many contexts, providing a signatory to a contract with greater 
protection than that afforded to the world at large is justified.313 
Contracting parties voluntarily subject themselves to obligations that, 
although similar to obligations owed to the general public, are 
unique.314 In the context of residential lease, however, the imposition 
of different schemes of liability in contract versus tort becomes 
difficult to defend. The landlord, aware that the premises are let for the 
purpose of a dwelling, expects the premises to be occupied by not only 
the tenant but also the tenant's family and occasionally even guests.315 
In some circumstances, the landlord may even derive economic benefit 
from the tenant's family members. In dual-earner households, a 
nonsignatory commonly contributes to the payment of rent. There is 
little justification, then, for the provision of unique contract-based 
remedies for personal injury to a signatory tenant. The human element 
underscores the lack of theoretical legitimacy. That is, in many cases 
an untenantable condition can pose a greater risk to a tenant's family 
members, especially small children, than to the adult signatory.316 
Recognizing landlord liability for defective premises as a hybrid 
liability allows for extension of the same, single cause of action to all 
parties. The civilian experience illustrates that mere recognition of 
concWTent liability in contract (for signatories) and tort (for all injured 
parties) does not go far enough to alleviate disparity in classes of 
plaintiffs. Although the signatory's tort suit is identical to the one 
available to third parties, the tenant enjoys a unique contractual claim 
3 13 .  See Litvinoff, supra note 1 4 ,  at 8 .  
3 14. Seeid 
3 15 .  PALMER, supra note 122, § 3- 17. 
3 16. This is certainly the case in Scotland, where children often suffer from asthma as 
a result of damp conditions in the leased premises. See supra text accompanying notes 208-
210. 
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that is unavailable to others.317 Recasting landlord liability for defective 
premises as contort provides a sound theoretical basis for reducing 
disparity between the claims of tenants and third parties. Thus far, 
only Louisiana has taken a step to close the divide, by relaxing the 
requirement of privity in an ad hoc fashion to provide a contractual 
theory of recovery to all persons who "reside in the premises in 
accordance with the lease," be they family members or roommates.318 
2. Increasing the Role of Fault in Determinations of Liability 
Recognizing that the landlord's obligation for the condition of the 
premises lies in both contract and tort also has the distinct advantage 
of freeing landlord liability for defective premises from what are 
essentially arbitrary rules governing "fault" in contract. The role of 
fault in contract law is a subject of heated debate both in common law 
and civilian jurisdictions, though the issues presented vary from one 
tradition to the other.319 Ultimately, the international trend is one of 
wider recognition of the role of contractual fault of both contractual 
obligors (here landlords) and obligees (here tenants). Recasting as 
contort places landlord liability for defective premises squarely ahead 
of this trend. 
In the common law, a perceived categorical rule of contract is 
liability without fault.320 The notion that contractual liability must be 
strict liability is largely a common law phenomenon; indeed, in many 
civilian and mixed jurisdictions, the notion of fault pervades the realm 
of contract.321 In the civil law, a distinction i s  drawn between a contract 
of means (in France, obligation de moyens) and a contract of result 
3 1 7. This is the current scenario in the American product liability law context, in 
which a buyer injured by a defective product may bring either a strict liability tort cause of 
action in addition to or in lieu of a contractual breach of warranty claim. See l DAVID G. 
0wEN ET AL., MADDEN & OwEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4.1  (3d ed. 2000). 
3 1 8. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2698 (201 0). 
3 1 9. See Stefan Grundmann, The Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: 
A Market Function Approach, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1 583, 1 586-92 (2009); Posner, supra note 
98, at 143 1 .  
320. See Ben-Shahar & Porat, supra note 98, at 1 34 1 ;  Galligan, supra note 98, at 463; 
Kreitner, supra note 98, at 1 5 3 3-35; Posner, supra note 98, at 1436. 
32 1 .  Richard A Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 1 07 MICH. L. REV. 
1349, 1 35 1  & n.8 (2009); WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., TORT LAW 33 (2000) ("It was also 
held, among other controversial distinctions, that contractual duties guarantee a particular 
outcome, while duties in tort only bind one to take reasonable care . . . .  Nowadays it is well 
established in all legal systems that contracts also lead frequently to duties to take care--0ften 
implied, whereas in the area of tort law liability not based on conduct-and generally 
triggered by the occurrence of a given event-becomes increasingly frequent."). 
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(obligation de resultaf').322 In the former, a party is liable only if he is 
shown to be at fault; whereas in the latter, a party is strictly liable for 
his failure to achieve a required result.323 In the common law, 
contractual "warranties" are generally thought of as akin to contracts 
of result, and thus strict in nature. As seen above, in the mixed 
jurisdictions, it appears as though the obligation to maintain the 
premises may be viewed as either an obligation of means or one of 
result. 
Analysis of the American approach to landlord liability reveals 
that attitudes about the role of fault in contract law drove the 
preference for a tort model of premises liability. As discussed above, a 
contingent of American courts and commentators favored a negligence 
standard over a strict liability standard for landlords, and thus, the tort 
model seemed to be the only fit.324 A historical review of the "rule" of 
strict liability in contract reveals the fundamental flaw of this approach. 
When, in the late nineteenth century, contract law became centered 
around freedom of will, the rule of strict liability came to embody the 
notion that contracting parties are free to impose absolute obligations 
on one another.325 Thus, the very theory that contractual obligations 
arise solely from will drove the imposition of strict liability in 
contract.326 Insofar as landlord liability for defective premises involves 
nonwaivable obligations imposed by law, it falls outside of the 
historical rationale for imposing strict contractual liability. 
Recasting as contort will allow jurisdictions to determine the 
appropriate standard of liability as a matter of policy as opposed to a 
matter of classification. It is not the aim of this Article to express a 
preference for a fault-based standard of liability over a strict liability 
standard, or to suggest that comparative analysis necessarily reveals the 
superiority of a particular approach. Rather, the responsibility that a 
particular jurisdiction chooses to impose upon residential landlords 
should reflect local concerns regarding housing and human rights 
issues which, as noted in the Introduction above, appear to have long 
foreclosed comparative research in the arena of property law. 327 These 
issues are inherently tied to local culture, ''the one feature of a legal 
system that cannot be borrowed, transplanted, or received."328 More 
322. Nicholas, supra note 306, at 952. 
323. Id 
324. See discussion supra Part H.B. 
325. Kreitner, supra note 98, at 1 535-36. 
326. Id 
3 2 7. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13. 
328. Palmer, supra note 1 34, at 537. 
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salient from a comparative view would be the failure of any 
jurisdiction to reanalyze the propriety of a standard of care that may 
have been utilized for hundreds of years in light of contemporary 
housing concerns. Unlike American jurisdictions, which have recently 
engaged in a comprehensive policy debate regarding the appropriate 
standard of care for landlords, the mixed jurisdictions studied here 
appear not to have reassessed the social propriety of the chosen 
standard of liability in a meaningful way in recent years. 
Even those jurisdictions that recognize the role of fault in the 
landlord's obligation to maintain the premises struggle with the 
question of how comparative fault principles may reduce the claim of 
an aggrieved party. Among the jurisdictions studied here, only 
Louisiana broadly authorizes the use of comparative fault principles in 
contractual claims. 329 Other jurisdictions have yet to apply comparative 
fault to the contractual realm, although this has recently been an issue 
of much interest and debate.330 Some agreement appears to be 
emerging that even if the use of comparative fault is not appropriate in 
all contractual claims, its use is appropriate when the contractual claim 
concurs with a similar or identical claim in tort.331 Moreover, the use of 
comparative fault may be particularly relevant where, as here, the 
contractual obligations of the parties are imposed by law rather than 
freely bargained. The use of comparative fault has been described as 
"unpersuasive in so far as it tends to undermine the contractual 
allocation of risks between the parties."332 But where parties have not 
freely allocated those risks, the defense of comparative fault should be 
available to a contracting party. One commentator has argued that a 
generalized contractual defense of comparative fault would 
"encourage cooperation, solidarity and caution" between parties to a 
329. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2003 (2010); LITVINOFF, supm note 1 32, § 5.35. 
330. See SA Law Commission, supm note 1 69, § 4.122; Ariel Porat, A Comparative 
Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1 397 (2009); Fabrizio Cafaggi, Creditor's 
Fault: In Search of a Comparative Frame, in FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW (Omri Ben­
Shahar & Ariel Porat eds. 2010). 
33 1 .  See SA Law Commission, supra note 169, § 4.1 12; Porat, supra note 330 (citing 
LAW COMM'N, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENCE IN CONTRACT para. 1 .4 (1993) 
("Over the years, the CFD [comparative fault defense] has spread into the contract law of 
many countries (such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel), albeit primarily in cases 
where a party breached a contractual duty of reasonable cave as in cases of concurrent tort or 
contract liability.")). Some American Courts have shown a willingness to apply comparative 
fault principles to cases involving breach of implied contractual warranties. Id at 1 397 n.4. 
Also, under the American Uniform Comparative Fault Act, "fault" is broadly construed to 
include breach of warranty, which straddles the line between contract and tort. UNIF. 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 & cmt., 12 UL.A. 125 (1 977). 
332. See SA Law Commission, supm note 169, § 4.1 17. 
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contract.333 Furthermore, such a defense would incentivize compliance 
with contractual obligations as well as the mitigation of damages 
resulting from breach. 334 Incentivizing the cooperation of contracting 
parties is of paramount importance where, as in a contract for 
residential lease, the parties enter into an ongoing and continuous 
relationship rather than a one-shot deal. 
The application of comparative fault principles to contractual 
claims may take place slowly and, in some jurisdictions, on a very 
limited basis. And yet, comparative fault principles could be applied 
to claims involving landlord liability for defective premises on an ad 
hoc basis regardless of the speed at which the trend toward 
comparative fault in contract evolves in a given jurisdiction. Recasting 
as contort provides the necessary freedom for such ad hoc treatment, 
which is desirable given the relative agreement on the utility of 
comparative fault for claims located at the contract-tort divide. 
In those jurisdictions employing a contract model, the landlord's 
defense of assumption of the risk can completely bar the plaintiff's 
claim. As indicated in the foregoing discussion of South Africa, 
Scotland, and Louisiana, the assumption of the risk defense rarely 
succeeds because landlords usually cannot show that a tenant clearly 
assented to the risk of harm. Even if such proof were available, an 
assumption of the risk defense does not make sense in the context of 
the landlord-tenant relationship. A relative disparity in bargaining 
power exists between residential landlord and tenant-a disparity that 
is recognized both by the implied nature of the obligation to repair and 
the nonwaivability of that obligation. Does a tenant ever have the 
requisite bargaining power to "assume" the risk freely by taking the 
premises subject to the existence of a defect?335 One Scottish tribunal 
observed that the assumption of the risk defense is predicated on the 
view that the tenant who discovers a dangerous defect should 
"repudiate the lease and go to live elsewhere."336 This rationale loses 
force in light of the fact that superior housing may be nonexistent, 
scarce, or otherwise unattainable. The more appropriate measure of a 
tenant's fault is not an alleged assumption of risk, but instead the 
333. Ariel Porat, Contributory Negligence in Contract Law: Toward a Pnncipled 
Approach, 28 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 141,  169 (1 994). 
334. Id 
335. See Palmer, supra note 49, at 25. 
336. See Hughes' Tutrix v. Glasgow Dist. Council, ( 1 982) S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 70, 72 
(Scot.). 
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tenant's comparative negligence in failing to identify or avoid an 
unsafe defect in the leased premises. 
3 .  Removing Artificial Obstacles to Remedies 
Finally, recasting the landlord's liability for the condition of the 
premises as contort provides injured parties with a full range of 
damages incurred, without concern for the theory of liability pled or 
proven. Currently, categorical rules governing damages awards in 
contract stand in the way of a tenant's recovery for personal injury 
damages as well as other consequential losses, such as those for 
personal property damage and "pure" nonpecuniary loss. Given that 
the landlord's obligation with respect to the premises is described in all 
jurisdictions in terms of physical safety, not only physical injuries but 
also mental pain and suffering attributable to threats to health and 
safety are well within the contemplation of the parties. Classification 
of a plaintiff's cause of action as falling within the ambit of contract 
rather than tort should not hinder such awards. 
The distinction between contract and tort with regard to damages 
is often highlighted in the realm of nonpecuniary loss.337 As a general 
rule in all jurisdictions studied here, a plaintiff may not recover 
nonpecuniary losses resulting from breach of contract. 338 Because 
contract law focuses primarily on protecting the economic concerns of 
the contracting parties, it follows that the protection provided by the 
law should be limited to economic or financial losses.339 A number of 
jurisdictions recognize exceptions to this general rule, and a growing 
international trend favors recognition of nonpecuniary losses wherever 
they occur. 140 This is the approach espoused by the Principles of 
European Contract Law341 and utilized in France342 and Quebec.343 
Many jurisdictions have not gone so far, however, in liberating their 
approach to nonpecuniary loss as a general matter. 
3 3 7. Galligan, sup.ra note 98, at 466-7 1 .  
338. See WILLISTON, supra note 97, § 64:7. 
339. Clive & Hutchison, supra note 199, at 1 84. 
340. Id 
341 .  PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 9:501(2)(a) (Ole Lando & Hugh 
Beale eds., 2000). 
342. Suzanne Galand-Carval, France: Non-Pecuniary Loss Under French Law, in 
DAMAGES FOR NON-PECUNIARY Loss IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 87, 1 00 (WV. Horton 
Rogers ed., 2001); Palmer, supra note 200, at 2 13-14. 
343 . Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 199 1 ,  c. 64, art. 1 458 (Can.) ("[H]e is liable for any 
bodily, moral or material injury he causes to the other contracting party."); Palmer, supra note 
200, at 2 1 3-14. 
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In South Africa the rule against nonpecuniary damages for 
breach of contract remains strict and gives way to few exceptions.344 
Thus tenants may not recover contractual damages for physical pain 
and suffering.345 Additionally, in the United States, tenant claims for 
personal injuries have been entirely relegated to tort.346 This result 
seems especially bizarre in the United States, where the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts provides an explicit exception for breaches of 
contract involving bodily harm.347 The question also arises whether it 
is sensible to restrict the landlord's obligation to the tort realm, 
effectively stripping it of its place in contract, merely because a 
plaintiff pursues nonpecuniary damages. In both South Africa and the 
United States, this approach has resulted in unintended consequences. 
In South Africa, the tenant's inability to recover nonpecuniary losses in 
contract deprives the contractual cause of action of much of its utility, 
with the result that most tenant claims are brought in tort rather than 
on the contract. 348 In the United States, several jurisdictions have gone 
too far by entirely foreclosing the possibility of recovery of any 
consequential losses in contract.349 Also, the relegation of personal 
injury claims to tort by American jurisdictions has resulted in the 
anomalous phenomenon that vengeful landlords may evict tenants who 
have filed personal injury lawsuits, but not tenants who have filed 
claims for repairs or rent abatement.350 
In contrast to South Africa, in Louisiana and Scotland, damages 
for emotional distress are awarded for breach of the landlord's 
contractual obligation as an exception to the general rule against 
nonpecuniary losses. Scotland has jurisprudentially allowed recovery 
of general damages for pain and suffering related to personal injury in 
contracts involving sales of defective goods as well as leases of 
defective premises, though in neither case has the rationale for this 
exception been fully explored. Recognizing the hybrid nature of the 
344. Palmer, supm note 200, at 2 1 3. 
345. See discussion supm Part III.B. I .  
346. See discussion supm Part H.B. 
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 ( 1 982) (''Recovery for emotional 
disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the 
breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result."). 
This rule has been adopted in most U.S. jurisdictions. See WILLISTON, supm note 97, § 64:7 
& n.2 1 .  Note, however, that the original Restatement's formulation of the rule required not 
only bodily injury but also "wanton or reckless breach." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CON TRACTS § 341 (1932). 
348. See discussion supra Part III.A 
349. See discussion supra Part 11.B. 
350. See discussion supra Part H.B. 
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landlord's obligation for the condition of the premises provides a 
wanting theoretical justification for the exception. In Louisiana, where 
nonpecuniary damages for mental suffering are authorized by the Civil 
Code, and where "pure" emotional distress damages are awarded in 
appropriate cases, courts appear reluctant to award pain and suffering 
damages on a contract theory. At one time in Louisiana's legal history 
the tenant's actions against the landlord in tort and contract were very 
similar, making irrelevant a specific award of nonpecuniary damages 
on the contract as opposed to in tort. Now that tort reforms have 
reduced the standard of care in tort to negligence, it is clear that tenants 
are more protected by strict liability in contract, and therefore awards 
of pain and suffering damages under a contract theory are more 
valuable. Recasting landlord liability for defective premises as contort 
could assist to reverse the jurisprudential trend against contractual 
awards for personal injury losses. 
Moreover, nonpecuniary awards for breach of the landlord's 
repair obligation are not only conceptually attractive, they are socially 
desirable. Nonpecuniary damages, particularly those awarded for 
emotional distress and inconvenience in the absence of physical injury, 
can serve a vital deterrent function closely linked to the social policy 
of tenant protection by providing the landlord with an economic 
incentive for keeping the premises in good repair.351 If nonpecuniary 
losses are generally awarded only when a tenant is physically injured, 
the deterrent function is lost for those defects that pose a serious risk to 
human health and safety, but that by luck or chance do not in fact 
physically injure the tenant, the tenant's family, or guests. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has had a dual aim: to contribute to the comparative 
examination of tenancy law in a modest fashion, and i n  so doing, to 
provide a critical appraisal of the American approach to landlord 
liability for defective premises. The very adoption of the implied 
warranty of habitability in the common law represents a closing of the 
once vast gulf between the civil law and common law approaches to 
residential tenancy.352 Moreover, comparative analysis reveals that the 
United States has not been alone in its struggle to characterize landlord 
liability as contract- or tort-based. Thus, the civil law and common 
3 5 1 .  See Smith, supra note 38, at 548-49. 
352. The prior difference in approach was once described as "a difference that goes to the root of fundamental conceptions." Cohn, supra note 1 0, at 399. 
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law approaches to the landlord's obligation to maintain the premises 
have converged both at the macro and the micro levels. Although the 
"bifurcated" American approach suffers from some conceptual 
anomalies, the "concurrent" approach utilized by South Africa, 
Scotland, and Louisiana is also unsatisfactory. Recasting landlord 
liability for the condition of the premises as a single, hybrid cause of 
action addresses both conceptual and practical incongruities rife within 
the American common law as well as within these mixed jurisdictions. 
Providentially, the framework for dealing with the special nature 
of landlord liability for defective premises is largely already in place. 
Each jurisdiction studied here except Louisiana has implemented a 
special statutory scheme to govern aspects of residential tenancy. The 
United States' Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and 
related landlord-tenant statutes, Scotland's Housing Act, and South 
Africa's Rental Housing Act could each be amended with relative ease 
to alter the existing scheme for landlord liability for defective 
premises. Even in Louisiana, where a special statutory regime for 
rental housing does not yet exist, ad hoc statutory enactments dealing 
with contorts are not entirely foreign.353 Each jurisdiction must utilize 
its own framework to develop a single, unified cause of action 
designed to address landlord liability for defective premises. Although 
each jurisdiction will begin at a unique starting point, all should adapt 
existing law with a view toward a collective end: eliminating the 
distinction between contract and tort, which has led to anomalous, 
inefficient, and unjust effects in this area of the law. 
Although the distinction between contract and tort remains 
theoretically and academically sound, the formal categories of law 
shaped by tradition and by accident tend to obscure the social 
problems with which the law deals.354 Formalistic divisions between 
contract and tort occasionally must give way to permit creative 
solutions to specific social ills. Now that residential landlords are 
more stringently regulated by the state, the contract of residential lease 
finds itself at the precarious boundary between contract and tort. 
Recognizing the landlord's obligation for the condition of the premises 
as contort is the first step toward designing the creative solutions 
353.  Indeed, Louisiana's Products Liability Act removed claims involving personal 
injury from the duality of contract (sale) versus tort in the late 1 980s. See Louisiana Products 
Liability Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51 -.60 (2010). 
354. See Brainerd Currie, The Matenals of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL Eouc. 33 1 ,  334 
(195 1 ). 
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needed to appropriately balance the rights of residential landlords and 
their tenants. 
